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This benchguide provides an overview of the law and procedure relating to restitution fines, fees, and orders in adult, juvenile, and diversion matters. Sections 83.2–83.3 contain procedural checklists. Sections 83.4–83.113 summarize the applicable law. Section 83.114 provides information about the California Victim Compensation Board (CalVCB).

II. PROCEDURAL CHECKLISTS

A. [§83.2] Restitution Fines

(1) Before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest:

(a) Advise defendant that the sentence will include a restitution fine of $300 to $10,000 for a felony conviction, and $150 to $1,000 for a misdemeanor conviction, in addition to any other fine the court may impose. For discussion, see §83.11.

JUDICIAL TIPS: The admonition may be, and often is, part of a written form. Defendant should be advised of the range of the fine and not merely the possible maximum. The admonition should also cover any additional probation, parole, postrelease...
community supervision, or mandatory supervision revocation restitution fines.

(b) Determine whether the disposition is part of a plea bargain.

- If so, ascertain on the record whether the bargain limits the court’s discretion with respect to the restitution fine.

JUDICIAL TIP: Proposed dispositions that purport to waive the fine or set it below the statutory minimum should be rejected. Pen C §1202.4(b); see §83.5.

(2) Before sentencing:

(a) Preliminarily determine the amount of the restitution fine by considering

- Any limitation imposed by a negotiated plea. Illustrations: fine to be in amount of statutory minimum; “wobbler” to be sentenced as misdemeanor.

JUDICIAL TIP: In the aftermath of a plea bargain that failed to address the restitution fine, which was not mentioned in the court’s advisements of the consequences of the plea, the court must either impose the minimum fine or give defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea. But if the court, in accepting the plea, advises the defendant that a restitution fine at or above the minimum will be imposed, the court is not precluded from imposing a fine above the statutory minimum. For discussion, see §83.13.

- The statutory range:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Misdemeanor</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony</td>
<td>$300</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For juvenile offenders, see §83.9.

- Seriousness and circumstances of the offense. Pen C §1202.4(b)(1), (d).

- Defendant’s economic gains, if any, from the crime; losses suffered by others; the number of victims, and any other relevant factors. Pen C §1202.4(d); for discussion, see §83.15.

- Inability to pay if the amount of the fine is to be in set in excess of the statutory minimum. Pen C §1202.4(c). For discussion, see §83.16.
JUDICIAL TIP: Judges often consider the amount of restitution to victims and other fines defendant will be ordered to pay. Again, these considerations only affect the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the statutory minimum.

- The formula set out in Pen C §1202.4(b)(2) permits, but does not require, the court to set a restitution fine in a felony case as follows: the minimum fine multiplied by the number of years of imprisonment the defendant is ordered to serve, multiplied by the number of felony counts of which the defendant is convicted.

JUDICIAL TIP: Some judges simplify the formula to the minimum fine multiplied by the number of felony counts. In the view of some judges, a life sentence calls for the maximum fine.

(b) Determine whether an additional probation revocation restitution fine must be imposed and suspended under Pen C §1202.44. Such a fine is mandatory whenever a defendant receives a conditional sentence or a sentence that includes a period of probation. For discussion, see §83.6.

(c) In a felony case determine whether any of the following additional fines must be imposed and suspended under Pen C §1202.45:

- Parole revocation restitution fine. This fine is mandatory when defendant will be sentenced to state prison and will be eligible for parole. For discussion, see §83.7.

- Postrelease community supervision revocation restitution fine. This fine is mandatory when defendant will be sentenced to state prison and will be subject to postrelease community supervision under Pen C §3451. See §83.8.

- Mandatory supervision revocation restitution fine. This fine is mandatory when defendant will be sentenced to county jail and will be subject to mandatory supervision under Pen C §1170(h)(5)(B). See §83.8.

(d) Consider whether there are compelling and extraordinary reasons not to impose a restitution fine. Pen C §1202.4(c); for discussion, see §83.21. If yes, make notes for statement of reasons and proceed to (e); if no, proceed to (f).

JUDICIAL TIPS: Inability to pay is not an adequate reason. Pen C §1202.4(c). Nor, in the view of most judges, is a prison sentence. See §§83.5, 83.16.
(e) Determine either (i) how much community service to require of defendant instead of the restitution fine or (ii) whether there are compelling and extraordinary reasons to waive the requirement. Pen C §1202.4(n). In the event of (ii), make notes for a second statement of reasons at sentencing.

(3) At sentencing:

(a) Consider matters raised by counsel and make final decision concerning the restitution fine.

JUDICIAL TIP: Restitution fines are normally imposed at the sentencing hearing; defendant is not entitled to a separate hearing. Pen C §1202.4(d). See § 83.14.

To impose a restitution fine proceed to (b); to waive the fine proceed to (f).

(b) Impose a restitution fine (Pen C §1202.4).

JUDICIAL TIPS:

• No portion of this fine may be stayed, suspended, or offset by the amount of victim restitution defendant is ordered to pay. See §83.22.

• As long as the fine is imposed, findings are unnecessary (Pen C §1202.4(d)) and usually not made. See §83.19.

• The court should not enter a separate money judgment. Although restitution fines are enforceable in the manner of money judgments, the court may not actually enter a money judgment against a defendant for these amounts. See §83.32.

(c) If defendant is granted probation:

• Make payment of the fine a condition of probation. Pen C §1202.4(m).

• Impose an additional probation revocation restitution fine in the same amount as the restitution fine and order it suspended unless probation is revoked. Pen C §1202.44. The court cannot waive or reduce this fine absent compelling and extraordinary reasons, which must be stated on the record. See §83.6.

(d) If the defendant is sentenced to state prison and the sentence includes a period of parole, impose an additional parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount as the restitution fine and order it suspended unless parole is revoked. Pen C §1202.45(a). See §83.7.
(e) If the defendant is sentenced to state prison and the sentence includes a period of postrelease community supervision under Pen C §3451, impose an additional postrelease community supervision revocation restitution fine in the same amount as the restitution fine and order it suspended unless postrelease community supervision is revoked. Pen C §1202.45(b). See §83.8.

(f) If the defendant is convicted of a felony and sentenced to county jail pursuant to Pen C §1170(h), and the sentence includes a period of mandatory supervision under Pen C §1170(h)(5)(B), impose an additional mandatory supervision revocation restitution fine in the same amount as the restitution fine and order it suspended unless mandatory supervision is revoked. Pen C §1202.45(b). See §83.8.

(g) When no restitution fine is imposed:

(i) State compelling and extraordinary reasons for this action on the record and

(ii) Order defendant, as a condition of probation, to perform community service as specified by the court instead of the fine, or state on the record compelling and extraordinary reasons for not ordering community service. Pen C §1202.4(n). See §83.21.

◆ JUDICIAL TIP: This statement should be in addition to the statement of reasons for not imposing a restitution fine. Pen C §1202.4(n).

B. [§83.3] Victim Restitution

(1) Before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest:

(a) Advise defendant that the sentence may include an order to pay restitution to the victim in an amount to be determined by the court. For discussion, see §83.37; see also Judicial Council Form CR-110 (Order for Victim Restitution).

◆ JUDICIAL TIPS: (1) When it is clear that the court will order restitution, many judges say so at this point. (2) The admonition can be incorporated into a written form.

(b) Advise defendant that he or she is entitled to a hearing in court to dispute the amount of restitution but not the actual order to make restitution. See §83.49.

◆ JUDICIAL TIP: Many judges prefer to give this advice at the time of sentencing.
(c) When there is a Harvey waiver that will give the court authority to consider dismissed counts for restitution purposes, make sure that the waiver is stated clearly on the record, that its scope is clear, and that defendant understands it. For discussion, see §83.110.

(2) Before sentencing consider the probation report, when available, and

(a) Whether restitution should be ordered
   - Because one or more victims suffered or will suffer an economic loss as a result of the crime(s) of which defendant was convicted (Pen C §1202.4(a)(1); for discussion, see §§83.47–83.105); or
   - As a condition of probation under Pen C §1203.1(j), when the victim’s losses are reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted; for discussion, see §83.106; or
   - For other reasons (e.g., Harvey waiver; hit-run victim); for discussion, see §§83.107–83.113).

JUDICIAL TIP: Judges may order victim restitution, if appropriate, for infractions. Although restitution fines are expressly limited to felonies and misdemeanors, there is no such express limitation with respect to victim restitution. See Pen C §§19.7 (statutes relating to misdemeanors generally applicable to infractions), 1202.4(a)(1) (legislative intent that crime victims who suffer economic loss receive restitution), 1202.4(f) (restitution required in every case in which victim suffered economic loss as result of defendant’s crime), and 1203b (courts may grant probation in infraction cases).

(b) Whether the report includes detailed loss figures for each victim.

(3) At sentencing

(a) Announce either:
   (i) The court’s preliminary views on restitution and inquire whether the victim or the defendant wishes to be heard. If yes, proceed to (c); if no, proceed to (d) to order restitution.

   Or

   (ii) That the probation report does not contain (sufficient) restitution information and proceed to (b).

(b) When the probation report lacks restitution data:

   (i) Ascertain whether the victim is present. If yes, receive the victim’s loss information; permit defendant to challenge it; on request continue to give defendant time to rebut it. If no, proceed to (ii).
Or

(ii) When the victim is not present and the report recommends a continuance, grant a reasonable continuance as to restitution issues.

JUDICIAL TIPS:

- Judges usually sentence the defendant even though restitution will be determined later. In such cases, the judge should include in the sentence an order for the defendant to pay restitution in an amount to be determined by the court. The court retains jurisdiction for the purpose of imposing restitution until the losses are determined.

- Judges often seek a waiver of defendant’s presence at the subsequent restitution hearing. This is particularly important when the defendant is sentenced to prison. For discussion, see §83.85.

Or

(iii) When the victim is not present, was notified, has not made a claim, and the report does not request a continuance, do not order restitution, except for any benefits that the victim received from the Restitution Fund.

JUDICIAL TIP: In many cases, the victim is not notified, and the prosecutor may not have any information regarding losses. In these situations, the court should order restitution for benefits that the victim received from the Restitution Fund. Any additional restitution may be ordered at a later date.

(c) Conduct a hearing when the victim or defendant requests one.

JUDICIAL TIP: The hearing does not have the formality of a trial. Hearsay is admissible. For discussion, see §83.54.

(d) Order defendant to pay restitution (for discussion, see §§83.84–83.90):

- Use a separate order for each victim. See Judicial Council Form CR-110 (Order for Victim Restitution).

- Identify each loss separately by name of victim and amount; do not merely order a lump sum payment.

- Specify whether interest (at 10 percent) will accrue from the date of the order or of the loss. Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(G). Note: If payment of restitution is a condition of probation, interest accrues
from the date of entry of the judgment or order. Pen C §1214.5. For
discussion, see §83.70.

• Specify whether codefendants are jointly and severally responsible
  for restitution.

• Do not delegate determination of restitution amount unless the
defendant consents to a determination by the probation officer;
determination of the number and dollar amounts of installment
  payments is often delegated to the probation department or other
  county agency. For discussion, see §83.87.

• When the sentence includes probation, make payment of the
  restitution order a condition of probation. Pen C §1202.4(m).

• Order defendant to pay restitution to the California Victim Com-
  pensation Board to reimburse payments to the victim from the

  JUDICIAL TIP: The court should not enter a separate money
  judgment. Although restitution orders are enforceable in the
  manner of money judgments, the court may not actually enter a
  money judgment against a defendant based on an order to pay
  restitution. For discussion, see §83.41.

(e) Make and stay a separate income deduction order on determining
  that defendant has the ability to pay restitution. Pen C §1202.42; for
discussion, see §83.93. For income deduction order and related forms, see
Judicial Council Form CR-118 (Information Regarding Income Deduction
Order), CR-119 (Order for Income Deduction), and CR-200 (Form
Interrogatories—Crime Victim Restitution).

  JUDICIAL TIP: Penal Code §1202.42 does not apply to juvenile
court restitution or to any restitution order not made under Pen C
  §1202.4. For discussion of orders to apply a specified portion of
earnings to restitution, see §83.94.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Restitution Fine

1. [§83.4] Purpose of Fine

   Restitution fines are a major source of financing the state Restitution
   Fund (see Pen C §§1202.4(e), 1202.44, 1202.45); penalty assessments on
   other fines provide additional financing. See Pen C §1464. Eligible
   victims of criminal acts may obtain restitution from the Restitution Fund,
   which is administered by the California Victim Compensation Board. For
detailed information about the Board’s Victim Compensation Program, see §83.114.

2. Major Statutory Requirements

a. [§83.5] Restitution Fine (Pen C §1202.4)

The principal statutes that govern the imposition of restitution fines on adult offenders are Pen C §§1202.4, 1202.44, and 1202.45. For discussion of Pen C §§1202.44 and 1202.45, see §§83.6–83.8; for juvenile offenders, see §§83.9–83.10. Key features of Pen C §1202.4 include:

- **Mandatory nature of fine.** Imposition of the fine is mandatory except for compelling and extraordinary reasons stated on the record. See §83.21.
- **Statutory minimums and maximums:**
  
  | Felonies: | $300–$10,000 |
  | Misdemeanors: | $150–$1,000 |
- **Limited effect of inability to pay.** Defendant’s lack of ability to pay does not justify waiver of the fine. It may be considered only in setting the amount above the statutory minimum. For discussion, see §83.16; for discussion of other factors the court should consider in setting the fine, see §83.15.
- **Hearing.** Defendant is not entitled to a separate hearing for determining the amount of the fine. For discussion see §83.14.
- **Community service.** When the court does not impose a restitution fine, defendant must be ordered to perform community service except for compelling and extraordinary reasons stated on the record. For discussion, see §83.21.
- **Probation.** Grants of probation must include payment of the restitution fine as a condition.

b. [§83.6] Probation Revocation Restitution Fine (Pen C §1202.44)

When a defendant receives a conditional sentence or a sentence that includes a period of probation, the court must impose an additional probation revocation restitution fine. Pen C §1202.44. In felony cases, the fine applies both to defendants who are placed on probation after the court has suspended imposition of sentence and defendants who are placed on

The probation revocation restitution fine has the following features (Pen C §1202.44):

- The fine must be imposed in addition to, not instead of, the restitution fine required by Pen C §1202.4;
- The amount of the fine is the same as the amount imposed for the restitution fine under Pen C §1202.4;
- The fine does not become effective unless and until the probation or conditional sentence is revoked; and
- The court may not waive or reduce the fine, absent compelling and extraordinary reasons stated on the record.

c. [§83.7] Parole Revocation Restitution Fine (Pen C §1202.45(a))

When a defendant is convicted of a felony and the sentence includes a period of parole, the court must impose an additional parole revocation restitution fine. Pen C §1202.45(a).

The Courts of Appeal are divided on whether the trial court must impose a parole revocation restitution fine if defendant is sentenced to state prison and execution of that sentence is suspended. *People v Hunt* (2013) 213 CA4th 13, 16–20, 151 CR3d 874 (no; enactment of Pen C §1202.44 in 2004 (see §83.6) was evidence of the Legislature’s intent that all felony probation grants include a Pen C §1202.44 probation revocation fine, but not a parole revocation restitution fine, when a Pen C §1202.4(b) restitution fine is imposed); *People v Hannah* (1999) 73 CA4th 270, 274–275, 86 CR2d 395 (no); *People v Preston* (2015) 239 CA4th 415, 423–425, 191 CR3d 170 (yes); *People v Calabrese* (2002) 101 CA4th 79, 86–87, 123 CR2d 570 (yes); *People v Tye* (2000) 83 CA4th 1398, 1400–1401, 100 CR2d 507 (yes).

When the trial court initially suspends imposition of sentence, it must impose a parole revocation fine at the time sentence is imposed, even when there is a lapse of time between the imposition of the restitution fine (see §83.5) and the imposition of a sentence that includes a period of parole. *People v Preston, supra*, 239 CA4th at 425–428.

The parole revocation restitution fine has the following features (Pen C §1202.45(a), (c)):

- The fine must be imposed in addition to, not instead of, the restitution fine required by Pen C §1202.4.
- The amount of the fine is the same as the amount imposed for the restitution fine under Pen C §1202.4.
§83.8

The fine must be suspended unless and until parole is revoked.

The court may not impose the parole revocation restitution fine if the defendant is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. *People v Oganesyan* (1999) 70 CA4th 1178, 1183, 83 CR2d 157. However, if the defendant receives a determinate term and a parole ineligible term, the fine may be imposed. *People v Brasure* (2008) 42 C4th 1037, 1074, 71 CR3d 675 (defendant sentenced to death for capital murder and to determinate prison term under Pen C §1170 for several other offenses).

If the court sentences a felony defendant to county jail under Pen C §1170(h), whether or not the court suspends the execution of a concluding portion of the term (i.e., “split” sentence), a parole revocation restitution fine may not be imposed because there is no formal state parole period following release from a county jail commitment. See *People v Cruz* (2012) 207 CA4th 664, 671–672, 143 CR3d 742. However, the court must impose a mandatory supervision revocation restitution fine in such cases. For discussion, see §83.8.

d. [§83.8] Postrelease Community Supervision Revocation and Mandatory Supervision Revocation Restitution Fines (Pen C §1202.45(b))

When a defendant is convicted of a crime and is subject to either postrelease community supervision under Pen C §3451 or mandatory supervision under Pen C §1170(h)(5)(B), the court must impose an additional postrelease community supervision revocation restitution fine or mandatory supervision revocation restitution fine. Pen C §1202.45(b).

The postrelease community supervision revocation restitution fine and mandatory supervision revocation restitution fine have the following features (Pen C §1202.45(b), (c)):

- The fine must be imposed in addition to, not instead of, the restitution fine required by Pen C §1202.4.
- The amount of the fine is the same as the amount imposed for the restitution fine under Pen C §1202.4.
- The fine must be suspended unless and until postrelease community supervision or mandatory supervision is revoked.
e. [§83.9] Juvenile Offenders (Welf & I C §730.6)

Juvenile offenders are also subject to mandatory restitution fines. Welf & I C §730.6. The principal features of the provisions governing juveniles are:

- The felony fine range is $100 to $1,000; the misdemeanor fine cannot exceed $100. There is no prescribed minimum misdemeanor fine. Welf & I C §730.6(b)(1).
- The factors that the court should consider in setting the fine are essentially the same as for adult offenders. See Welf & I C §730.6(d)(1). See also chart in §83.10. Express findings are unnecessary and usually not made. See Welf & I C §730.6(e).
- Imposition of the fine is mandatory, except for compelling and extraordinary reasons in felony cases. The reasons must be stated on the record. Welf & I C §730.6(g)(1). The restitution fine cannot be waived for misdemeanors, probably because there is no statutory minimum fine with respect to them.
- If the minor is a person described in Welf & I C §241.1(a) (dual status dependent child and ward of the court under Welf & I C §300 and Welf & I C §601 or §602, respectively), the court must waive imposition of the restitution fine. Welf & I C §730.6(g)(2).
- When the fine is waived, the minor must be required to perform community service except for compelling and extraordinary reasons stated on the record. Welf & I C §730.6(n), (o).
- Inability to pay does not justify failure to impose a restitution fine. Welf & I C §730.6(c). It is a factor in setting the amount of the fine. The offender has the burden of showing inability, but is not entitled to a separate hearing. Welf & I C §730.6(b), (d)(2). In determining a juvenile offender’s ability to pay, the court may consider the juvenile’s future earning capacity. Welf & I C §730.6(d)(2).
- Payment of the fine must be a condition of probation. Welf & I C §730.6(l).
- Parents and guardians may be jointly and severally liable. Welf & I C §730.7.
f. [§83.10] Chart: Comparison of Restitution Fine Provisions for Adult and Juvenile Offenders
(Pen C §§1202.4, 1202.44, 1202.45; Welf & I C §730.6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Adult</th>
<th>Juvenile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount of fine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misdemeanor</td>
<td>$150–$1,000</td>
<td>Not more than $100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony</td>
<td>$300–$10,000</td>
<td>$100–$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors to consider when setting fine above statutory minimum</td>
<td>All relevant factors including but not limited to:</td>
<td>Inapplicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inability to pay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Seriousness of offense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Circumstances of commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic gain by offender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Losses to others from offense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of victims; Optional formula for multiple felonies</td>
<td>Inapplicable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burden of showing inability to pay when court sets fine above statutory minimum</td>
<td>Offender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiver of fine</td>
<td>Only for compelling and extraordinary reasons stated on record; inability to pay not adequate reason</td>
<td>Inapplicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inapplicable</td>
<td>No waiver when offense is a misdemeanor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community service</td>
<td>Mandatory when fine waived except for compelling and extraordinary reasons stated on record</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of restitution to victim</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Juvenile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot be offset against fine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation to probation</th>
<th>Payment must be condition of probation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probation revocation fine</td>
<td>Must be imposed separately in same amount as restitution fine and suspended unless and until probation or conditional sentence is revoked</td>
<td>Inapplicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Parole revocation fine | Must be imposed separately in same amount as restitution fine and suspended unless and until parole is revoked | Inapplicable |

| Postrelease community supervision revocation restitution fine; mandatory supervision revocation restitution fine | Must be imposed separately in same amount as restitution fine and suspended unless and until postrelease community supervision or mandatory supervision is revoked | Inapplicable |

3. Procedure at Time of Guilty Plea

a. [§83.11] Advisement When Taking Plea

A restitution fine is a direct consequence of a guilty or no contest plea. Accordingly, the court must advise defendant of the imposition of a restitution fine, with specific mention of the statutory minimum and maximum amounts. *People v Villalobos* (2012) 54 C4th 177, 185, 141 CR3d 491.
b. [§83.12] Fine Amount Negotiable

Defendants are free to negotiate the amount of restitution fines as part of their plea bargains. The parties to a criminal proceeding may choose to agree on a specific amount between the statutory minimum and maximum, or they may leave it up to the sentencing court’s discretion. *People v Villalobos* (2012) 54 C4th 177, 181–182, 141 CR3d 491.

c. [§83.13] Silent Plea Bargain

When the parties have not mentioned the amount of the restitution fine during the plea negotiation and the trial court has not threatened or promised any particular amount of fine during the plea colloquy, the amount of the fine is not part of the plea agreement, and the trial court is free to impose a fine within the statutory range. Absent an expressly negotiated term in the plea bargain concerning the fine, there is no basis to conclude that imposition of a fine within the statutory range constitutes more punishment than that for which the defendant bargained. *People v Villalobos* (2012) 54 C4th 177, 181–186, 141 CR3d 491. The court overruled *People v Walker* (1991) 54 C3d 1013, 1028–1029, 1 CR2d 902, to the extent it suggests that silence by the parties and trial court concerning a statutorily mandated punishment makes exclusion of the punishment a negotiated term of a plea bargain. 54 C4th at 183.

**JUDICIAL TIPS:**

- Counsel should be asked to state any agreement with respect to the fine when putting the proposed terms of negotiated plea on the record.
- When the negotiations leave the fine open, the court should explain to the defendant the statutory minimum and maximum fine amount or have counsel do so and obtain defendant’s oral assent.
- The court should give the Pen C §1192.5 admonition (relating to the defendant’s right to withdraw the plea) whenever required by that statute. See 54 C4th at 186.

4. Determination of Fine

a. [§83.14] No Separate Hearing

The defendant is not entitled to a hearing apart from the sentencing hearing with respect to the restitution fine. Pen C §1202.4(d).

**JUDICIAL TIP:** Both sides should be given an opportunity to address the matter at the sentencing hearing, because, inter alia,
defendant has the burden of demonstrating inability to pay. Pen C §1202.4(d).

b. [§83.15] Factors

Statutory factors. In determining the amount of the fine, the court should consider any relevant factor (Pen C §1202.4(d)), including:

- Inability to pay (for discussion, see §83.16);
- Seriousness of the offense;
- Circumstances of the offense;
- Defendant’s economic gain, if any, from the crime;
- Pecuniary and intangible losses of victims or dependents of victims;
- Number of victims.


Optional formula. In multicount felony cases the court may set the fine by using the formula stated in Pen C §1202.4(b)(2). For discussion, §83.17.

Juveniles. Factors to consider in juvenile cases are virtually the same as in cases involving adult offenders. See chart in §83.10.

c. [§83.16] Ability To Pay

Defendant is presumed to be able to pay the restitution fine and has the burden of demonstrating inability. Pen C §1202.4(d); People v Romero (1996) 43 CA4th 440, 448–449, 51 CR2d 26.

The court may consider future earning capacity. Pen C §1202.4(d); People v Gentry (1994) 28 CA4th 1374, 1376–1377, 34 CR2d 37 (court may consider defendant’s future prison wages as well as possibility of employment when defendant is released from prison).

The court must impose the minimum fine even when defendant is unable to pay it. Pen C §1202.4(c); Welf & I C §730.6(b). The court may consider inability to pay only when increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the $300 or $150 minimum. Pen C §1202.4(c). Such a mandate is not constitutionally infirm; however, imprisonment of an indigent defendant for nonpayment violates equal protection. People v Long (1985) 164 CA3d 820, 826–827, 210 CR 745.
d. [§83.17] Multiple Counts

Discretionary formula. For defendants convicted of several felony counts the court may calculate the fine by the following formula (Pen C §1202.4(b)(2)):

$300 \times \text{(number of years of sentence)} \times \text{(number of counts of which defendant was convicted)} = \text{fine amount.}

JUDICIAL TIP: Some judges simplify the formula to $300 \times \text{(number of counts)}$. In the view of some judges, a life sentence calls for the maximum fine.

Limitation of maximum. The total fine may not exceed the statutory maximum, regardless of the number of victims and counts. People v Blackburn (1999) 72 CA4th 1520, 1534, 86 CR2d 134; People v Ivans (1992) 2 CA4th 1654, 1667, 4 CR2d 66 (decided under former Govt C §13967).

Resolution of multiple cases under negotiated plea bargain. When a defendant enters separate pleas to separately filed cases under a single plea bargain and is sentenced on all the cases at the same time, the court may impose a separate restitution fine in each case. People v Soria (2010) 48 C4th 58, 62–66, 104 CR3d 780.

Resolution of multiple cases in joint trial. When a defendant is convicted of crimes in two cases that are consolidated for trial, the court may not impose restitution fines in both cases, even if the cases involve charges in separately filed informations. People v Ferris (2000) 82 CA4th 1272, 1275–1278, 99 CR2d 180.

Conviction of felony and misdemeanor in same proceeding. When a defendant is convicted of both a felony and misdemeanor in the same proceeding, the court must impose a separate restitution fine for each, so long as the total of the restitution fines does not exceed the statutory maximum. People v Holmes (2007) 153 CA4th 539, 546–548, 63 CR3d 150.

Counts stayed under Pen C §654. The trial court may not consider a felony conviction for which the sentence is stayed under Pen C §654 as part of the court’s calculation of the restitution fine under the formula provided in Pen C §1202.4(b)(2). People v Le (2006) 136 CA4th 925, 932–934, 39 CR3d 146.
c. [§83.18] No Joint and Several Liability for Restitution Fines

Restitution fines (Pen C §1202.4(b)), probation revocation restitution fines (Pen C §1202.44), parole revocation restitution fines (Pen C §1202.45(a)), postrelease community supervision revocation restitution fines (Pen C §1202.45(b)), and mandatory supervision revocation restitution fines (Pen C §1202.45(b)) may not be imposed as payable jointly and severally by multiple defendants. People v Kunitz (2004) 122 CA4th 652, 655–658, 18 CR3d 843 (although court addressed only Pen C §§1202.4(b) and 1202.45(a) fines, reasoning applicable to Pen C §1202.44 and 1202.45(b) fines).

Direct victim restitution is not punishment, and it may be imposed jointly and severally. 122 CA4th at 657. For discussion, see §83.90.

f. [§83.19] Findings

The court need not specify reasons for setting the fine in any particular amount; only when the court waives the fine must reasons be stated. Pen C §1202.4(b), (d); People v Urbano (2005) 128 CA4th 396, 405, 26 CR3d 871; People v Romero (1996) 43 CA4th 440, 448, 51 CR2d 26 (court not required to make findings on ability to pay); for discussion of fine waiver, see §83.21.

JUDICIAL TIP: Some judges state reasons when they set the fine at a level that departs from their usual practice.

The amount of the fine is reviewed only for abuse of discretion and upheld when supported by the record. People v McGhee (1988) 197 CA3d 710, 716–717, 243 CR 46 (maximum restitution fine justified when court properly imposed upper prison term); People v Griffin (1987) 193 CA3d 739, 740–742, 238 CR 371 (record of recidivist thief convicted of petty theft with prior supports $2000 restitution fine).

The exercise of the court’s discretion to impose a restitution fine, taking into consideration various factors relating both to the offense and the offender (see §83.15), within the range prescribed by statute, does not run afoul of Apprendi v New Jersey (2000) 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435 (jury verdict required for every fact that increases penalty beyond statutory maximum for offense). People v Kramis (2012) 209 CA4th 346, 351–352, 147 CR3d 84.

g. [§83.20] Retrial or Remand for Resentencing

The court may not increase the restitution fine after a retrial that followed defendant’s successful appeal (People v Thompson (1998) 61 CA4th 1269, 1276, 76 CR2d 267) or after remand for resentencing
following the defendant’s partially successful appeal (People v Hanson (2000) 23 C4th 355, 366–367, 97 CR2d 58). Such an increase in the restitution fine is precluded by the state constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy (Cal Const art I, §15). 23 C4th at 366–367. The court has discretion, however, to reduce the amount of a previously imposed restitution fine at resentencing following remand. People v Rosas (2010) 191 CA4th 107, 117–120, 119 CR3d 74.

The Second District Court of Appeal held that an increase in one component of a monetary sentence will not render punishment more severe if another component is reduced by an equal amount. The protection against double jeopardy requires only that the aggregate monetary sentence, not each component thereof, be equal to or less than that originally imposed. So long as it is, a defendant has no interest in the particular amount of each separate fine. People v Daniels (2012) 208 CA4th 29, 32–33, 145 CR3d 33. In Daniels, a defendant’s increased restitution fine and parole revocation restitution fine, after he successfully appealed his first conviction and was retried and reconvicted, violated the state constitutional protection against double jeopardy only to the extent that the sum of those two fines plus the direct victim restitution exceeded the sum of the three restitution amounts in the defendant’s first trial. 208 CA4th 32–33.

5. [§83.21] Waiver of Fine

The court must impose a restitution fine unless it finds “compelling and extraordinary reasons” for not doing so and states them on the record. Pen C §1202.4(b), (c); People v Tillman (2000) 22 C4th 300, 302, 92 CR2d 741.

Inability to pay is not an adequate reason for waiving the fine. Pen C §1202.4(c). There is no judicial guidance on what constitutes compelling and extraordinary reasons. Sentencing a defendant to prison is not a sufficient reason because the fine can be collected from prison wages and trust account deposits. For discussion, see §83.25.

[JUDICIAL TIP: Some judges waive the fine in the case of street people who suffer from mental disabilities or other disabilities. Others excuse payment when the defendant is on SSI or receives General Assistance. Most judges do not, however, regard being jobless or homeless as sufficient reasons to waive the fine.]

When the court waives the fine, it must order the defendant to perform community service instead, unless it finds additional compelling and extraordinary reasons stated on the record. Pen C §1202.4(n).
JUDICIAL TIP: This statement should be in addition to the statement of reasons for not imposing a restitution fine. Pen C §1202.4(n).

The prosecution waives any objection to the trial court’s failure to impose a restitution fine under Pen C §1202.4 by failing to object to the omission at the time of sentencing; in such event, the appellate court may not modify the judgment to add a restitution fine. People v Tillman, supra, 22 C4th at 302–303. However, when the trial court imposes a restitution fine under Pen C §1202.4, but omits or imposes an erroneous parole revocation restitution fine under Pen C §1202.45 (see §83.7) and the prosecution does not object to this omission, an appellate court has the authority to modify the judgment to impose or correct the fine. People v Smith (2001) 24 C4th 849, 852–853, 102 CR2d 731 (trial court imposed $5000 restitution fine but only a $200 parole revocation fine); People v Rodriguez (2000) 80 CA4th 372, 375–379, 95 CR2d 299 (trial court imposed $200 restitution fine and no parole revocation fine).

6. [§83.22] No Crediting Amount of Restitution Against Restitution Fine

The court may not offset the amount of direct victim restitution against a Pen C §1202.4 restitution fine. People v Vazquez (2009) 178 CA4th 347, 357–358, 100 CR3d 351; People v Blackburn (1999) 72 CA4th 1520, 1534, 86 CR2d 134.

7. [§83.23] Penalty Assessments

Restitution fines, probation revocation restitution fines, parole revocation restitution fines, postrelease community supervision revocation restitution fines, and mandatory supervision revocation fines are exempt from the penalty assessments of Pen C §1464 and Govt C §76000, the state surcharge of Pen C §1465.7, the state court construction penalty of Govt C §70372(a), and the DNA penalty assessments of Govt C §76104.6 and Govt C §76104.7. Pen C §§1202.4(e), 1202.45(c), 1464(a)(3)(A), 1465.7(a); Govt C §§70372(a)(3)(A), 76000(a)(3)(A), 76104.6(a)(3)(A), 76104.7(c)(1).

8. [§83.24] Administrative Fees

Counties may impose a fee to cover the administrative costs of collecting the restitution fine. The fee may not exceed 10 percent of the amount of the fine. Pen C §1202.4(l); People v Robertson (2009) 174 CA4th 206, 210–211, 94 CR3d 179.
JUDICIAL TIP: In counties that charge this fee the sentence should include an order to pay it.

9. [§83.25] Collection of Fine by CDCR and DJJ

If a prisoner owes a restitution fine, the secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) may deduct a minimum of 20 percent or the balance owing on the fine amount, whichever is less, up to a maximum of 50 percent from prisoner’s wages and trust account deposits, and must transfer the moneys to the California Victim Compensation Board. Pen C §§2085.5(a), 2700.1 (collection from death-row inmates); see, e.g., People v Gentry (1994) 28 CA4th 1374, 1377–1378, 34 CR2d 37. The sentencing court must be provided a record of the payments. Pen C §2085.5(a).

JUDICIAL TIPS:

- Penal Code §2085.5 is self-executing and it is not necessary to refer to it when imposing sentence. If the judge chooses to make a reference, the judge should make it clear that the fine is imposed under Pen C §1202.4(b) and must be collected under Pen C §2085.5. Court documents should not state that the fine is imposed under Pen C §2085.5. See People v Rowland (1988) 206 CA3d 119, 124, 253 CR 190.

- Courts should make sure that the abstract of judgment reflects the restitution fine because the CDCR relies on the abstract. See People v Hong (1998) 64 CA4th 1071, 1080, 76 CR2d 23.

The CDCR’s Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) also collects restitution fines from wards’ wages and trust account deposits and transfers the moneys to the California Victim Compensation Board. The DJJ must provide the sentencing court with a record of payments. Welf & I C §§1752.81–1752.82.

10. [§83.26] Collection of Fine From County Jail Prisoners

If a prisoner is punished by imprisonment in a county jail under Pen C §1170(h) and owes a restitution fine, the agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated may deduct a restitution fine from the prisoner’s wages and trust account deposits (in same amounts as CDCR may deduct) and transfer the moneys to the California Victim Compensation Board. Pen C §2085.5(b)(1). The sentencing court must be provided a record of the payments. Pen C
§2085.5(b)(1). If the board of supervisors designates the county sheriff as the collecting agency, the board of supervisors must first obtain the concurrence of the county sheriff. Pen C §2085.5(b)(2).

11. [§83.27] Collection of Fines From Prisoners Released and Subject to Postrelease Community Supervision or Mandatory Supervision

When a prisoner is released from the custody of the CDCR or a county jail facility and is subject to postrelease community supervision or mandatory supervision, he or she has a continuing obligation to pay any restitution fine in full. Pen C §2085.6(a). The restitution fine obligation and any portion left unsatisfied on placement in postrelease community supervision or mandatory supervision is enforceable and may be collected, in a manner to be established by the county board of supervisors, by the department or county agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is released. If a county elects to collect restitution fines, the department or county agency designated by the county board of supervisors must transfer the moneys to the California Victim Compensation Board for deposit in the Restitution Fund. Pen C §2085.6(a).

Any portion of the restitution fine that remains unsatisfied after a person is released from postrelease community supervision or mandatory supervision continues to be enforceable by a victim under Pen C §1214 until the obligation is satisfied. Pen C §2085.6(c). For discussion, see §83.32.

12. [§83.28] Collection of Fines From Prisoners Released on Suspended Sentence

When a prisoner who owes a restitution fine, or any portion thereof, is released from the custody of a county jail facility after completion of a term in custody without being subject to postrelease community supervision or mandatory supervision under Pen C §1170(h)(5)(A), he or she has a continuing obligation to pay the restitution fine in full. Pen C §2085.7(a). The balance of the restitution fine remaining unpaid after completion of the term in custody is enforceable and may be collected, in a manner to be established by the county board of supervisors, by the department or county agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county in which the prisoner is released. If a county elects to collect restitution fines, the department or county agency designated by the county board of supervisors shall transfer the amount collected to the California Victim Compensation Board for deposit in the Restitution Fund. Pen C §2085.7(a).
Any portion of the restitution fine that remains unsatisfied after the completion of a term in custody under Pen C §1170(h)(5)(A) continues to be enforceable by a victim under Pen C §1214 until the obligation is satisfied. Pen C §2085.7(c), (g).

13. [§83.29] Collection of Fine From Parolees

In any case in which a parolee owes a restitution fine, the secretary of the CDCR, or when a prisoner is punished in county jail under Pen C §1170(h), the agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated may collect from the parolee any moneys owing on the restitution fine amount. Pen C §2085.5(g). Any monies collected must be transferred to the California Victim Compensation Board for deposit in the Restitution Fund. Pen C §2085.5(g). The sentencing court must be provided a record of the payments. Pen C §2085.5(g).

14. [§83.30] No Imprisonment To Satisfy Fine

Restitution fines cannot be converted to additional time spent in custody under the provisions of Pen C §1205. Pen C §1205(f).

15. [§83.31] Applying Seized Funds to Restitution Fine

The court may apply funds confiscated from the defendant at the time of the defendant’s arrest, except for funds confiscated under Health & S C §§11469–11495 (illegal drug funds), to the restitution fine if the funds are not exempt for spousal or child support or subject to any other legal exemption. Pen C §1202.4(c).

The common-law rule exempts from execution money belonging to an arrestee and held for safekeeping. See People v Willie (2005) 133 CA4th 43, 49–50, 34 CR3d 532. However, this common-law exemption does not apply to funds sought for payment of a restitution fine. Although the money would have been taken from defendant upon his or her preconviction arrest, the restitution fine is a debt created after he or she is convicted. 133 CA4th at 50. Further, this exemption has been superseded by CCP §704.090(b), which effectively limits the exemption to $300 for a restitution fine. 133 CA4th at 50–52.

16. [§83.32] Fine Enforceable as Civil Judgment

An order to pay a Pen C §1202.4, §1202.44, or §1202.45 restitution fine is enforceable as if it were a civil judgment. Pen C §1214(a). Restitution fines derived from misdemeanor cases, cases involving a
violation of a city or town ordinance, and noncapital cases with a plea of guilty or no contest, are enforceable in the same manner as a money judgment in a limited civil case. Pen C §1214(d); CCP §582.5.

A restitution fine is enforceable immediately and continues to be enforceable by the California Victim Compensation Board after termination of probation, parole, postrelease community supervision, or mandatory supervision, after a term of custody in county jail under Pen C §1170(h)(5)(A), or after completion of diversion. Pen C §§1214(a), (c), 1202.4(m); see also People v Chambers (1998) 65 CA4th 819, 821–823, 76 CR2d 732 (restitution fine survives revocation of probation and trial court is without authority to impose a second restitution fine).

JUDICIAL TIP: The court should not enter a separate money judgment. Execution can issue on the order to pay the fine. People v Hart (1998) 65 CA4th 902, 906, 76 CR2d 837. See also People v Willie (2005) 133 CA4th 43, 47–49, 34 CR3d 532 (district attorney’s motion for release of funds taken from defendant on his arrest for payment of restitution fine, and court’s nunc pro tunc order for their release, were not appropriate methods for enforcing the restitution fine).

A defendant is not entitled to have his or her conviction expunged under Pen C §1203.4 following termination of probation when the defendant has not paid the full amount of a restitution fine. However, if the defendant’s probation is discharged before the period of probation has expired, the defendant may move the court to expunge the conviction, thereby releasing the defendant from any continuing liability to pay any unpaid portion of a restitution fine. Pen C §1203.4(a)(1); People v Guillen (2013) 218 CA4th 975, 1003, 160 CR3d 589.

B. Restitution Fee in Diversion Matters

1. [§83.33] Mandatory Fee; Amount

In diversion and deferred entry of judgment cases the counterpart to the restitution fine is the restitution fee required by Pen C §1001.90. Imposition is mandatory (Pen C §1001.90(a), (c)), subject to exceptions discussed in §83.34.

The minimum fee is $100; the maximum, $1,000. Pen C §1001.90(b). The factors that should guide the court in setting the amount of the fee are essentially the same as apply to restitution fines. Pen C §1001.90(d); for discussion, see §83.15. The court may not modify the amount of the fee except to correct an error in setting the amount. Pen C §1001.90(e).
JUDICIAL TIP: Modification is probably warranted only when the fee was erroneously omitted, set below the statutory minimum or above the maximum, and to correct ministerial errors. Forgiveness of the fee on successful completion of diversion is probably precluded.

Counties may add a collection fee not to exceed 10 percent of the restitution fee. Pen C §1001.90(g).
Like restitution fines, the fee goes to the state Restitution Fund. Pen C §1001.90(f).

2. [§83.34] Exceptions

As with restitution fines, the court may waive the fee when it finds that there are compelling and extraordinary reasons and states them on the record. Pen C §1001.90(c). The fee must be imposed regardless of defendant’s ability to pay it; ability to pay is, however, a factor to be considered in setting the amount. Pen C §1001.90(c), (d).

Additionally, Pen C §1001.90 does not apply to diversion of defendants with cognitive developmental disabilities. Pen C §1001.90(a).

3. [§83.35] Fee Enforceable as Civil Judgment

An order to pay a diversion restitution fee is enforceable as if it were a civil judgment. Pen C §1214(a). A diversion restitution fee is enforceable immediately and continues to be enforceable by the California Victim Compensation Board after the defendant has completed diversion. Pen C §1214(a).

JUDICIAL TIP: The court should not enter a separate money judgment. Execution can issue on the order to pay the fee. People v Hart (1998) 65 CA4th 902, 906, 76 CR2d 837.

C. [§83.36] Victim Restitution

The court must order payment of restitution when the crime of which defendant was convicted resulted in economic loss to the victim. Pen C §1202.4; Welf & I C §730.6; Cal Const art I, §28(b)(13)(A). A sentence without a restitution award to a victim, as mandated by Cal Const art I, §28(b) and Pen C §1202.4 is invalid; the only discretion retained by the court is that of fixing the amount of the award. People v Rowlan (1997) 51 CA4th 1745, 1751–1752, 60 CR2d 351. For discussion, see §§83.47–83.105.
Under some circumstances California courts may order restitution when the losses are not the result of the crime underlying the defendant’s conviction. For example, in probation cases, the courts have broad discretion to order restitution that is reasonably related to the defendant’s crime. For discussion, see §§83.106–83.108. And courts may order restitution based on dismissed counts or uncharged offenses. For discussion, see §§83.110–83.113.

1. Principles Applicable to Restitution Generally

   a. Procedure at Time of Guilty Plea

      (1) [§83.37] Advisement When Taking Plea

      Restitution is a direct consequence of a guilty or no contest plea of which defendant must be advised. People v Rowland (1997) 51 CA4th 1745, 1752–1753, 60 CR2d 351; People v Valdez (1994) 24 CA4th 1194, 1203, 30 CR2d 4.

      Failure to so advise is fatal only if it prejudices the defendant. People v Rowland, supra, 51 CA4th at 1753 (no prejudice because, inter alia, amount of restitution ordered matched defendant’s civil liability).

      (2) [§83.38] Silent Plea Bargain

      A silent plea bargain does not circumscribe the mandatory duty of the trial court to order the payment of restitution. People v Valdez (1994) 24 CA4th 1194, 1203, 30 CR2d 4; see People v Campbell (1994) 21 CA4th 825, 829, 26 CR2d 433 (silent plea agreement did not nullify restitution order as condition of probation).

      When a defendant enters into a plea bargain in which the defendant reasonably believes he or she will be ordered to pay a small amount of restitution, and thereafter at sentencing is ordered to pay a much larger amount, the defendant is entitled to withdraw his or her plea. People v Brown (2007) 147 CA4th 1213, 1221–1228, 54 CR3d 887. The court in Brown stated that an award of victim restitution constitutes punishment for purposes of determining whether there is a violation of a plea agreement when the sentencing court imposes a larger restitution amount than that specified in the plea agreement. 147 CA4th 1221–1223. In this case the victim restitution order imposed was a significant deviation from the terms of the plea agreement. Specific performance was not an available remedy because full victim restitution is mandated by Cal Const art 1, §28(b)(13) and Pen C §1202.4(f), and the court has no discretion or authority to impose a negotiated sentence that provides for an award of less than full restitution. 147 CA4th at 1224–1228.
In *People v Rowland* (1997) 51 CA4th 1745, 60 CR2d 351, the plea agreement made no mention of victim restitution, and the trial court resented the defendant to include a substantial award of victim restitution. The First District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s conclusion that absent a showing of prejudice, the defendant was not entitled to withdraw his plea. 51 CA4th at 1750–1754. The court in *People v Brown*, supra, distinguished *Rowland*, by pointing out that because restitution was not mentioned in the plea agreement in that case, the trial court’s restitution order did not violate an express term of the agreement. 147 CA4th at 1223 n6.

b. §83.39 Right to Notice and Hearing

Victims and defendants have a right to a hearing and to notice. For discussion, see §§83.49–83.55.

c. §83.40 Restitution Not Affected by Bankruptcy


Bankruptcy does not block restitution even when defendant’s civil obligations to the victim were discharged by bankruptcy before criminal charges were filed. *People v Moser* (1996) 50 CA4th 130, 136, 57 CR2d 647.

Because collection of restitution is a continuation of a criminal action, the automatic stay provisions of bankruptcy law do not apply. See *In re Gruntz* (9th Cir 2000) 202 F3d 1074, 1084–1087 (automatic stay did not enjoin state court criminal proceedings against debtor for failure to pay child support); 11 USC §362(b)(1).

*Victim’s bankruptcy.* When the victim incurred an obligation to a third party as a result of defendant’s conduct, the bankruptcy discharge of the victim’s obligation does not preclude a restitution order. *People v Dalvito* (1997) 56 CA4th 557, 560–562, 65 CR2d 679 (bankruptcy is
economic loss despite discharge; no explanation why loss is equal to amount of obligation).

d. [§83.41] Order Enforceable as Civil Judgment

An order to pay restitution is deemed a money judgment and enforceable as if it were a civil judgment. Pen C §§1202.4(i), 1214(b); Welf & I C §730.6(r). Restitution orders derived from misdemeanor cases, cases involving a violation of a city or town ordinance, and noncapital cases with a plea of guilty or no contest, are enforceable in the same manner as a money judgment in a limited civil case. Pen C §1214(d); CCP §582.5.

The following conditions must be met before a restitution order may be enforced as if it were a civil judgment (Pen C §1214(b)):

1. The defendant was informed of the right to have a judicial determination of the amount, and

2. The defendant was
   - Provided with a hearing,
   - Waived a hearing, or
   - Stipulated to the amount of restitution.

In addition, Pen C §1214(b) gives victims and the California Victim Compensation Board the right to receive on request a certified copy of the restitution order and the defendant’s financial disclosure (see §83.102). See also Welf & I C §730.7(c) (victims of juvenile offenses entitled to certified copy of restitution order). If requested, the court must provide the financial disclosure to the district attorney in connection with an investigation or prosecution involving perjury or the veracity of the information contained in the disclosure. Pen C §1214(b).

Penal Code §1214(b) also gives victims “access to all resources available under the law to enforce the restitution order,” including, inter alia, wage garnishment and lien procedures.

A restitution order is enforceable immediately and continues to be enforceable by the victim after termination of defendant’s probation, parole, postrelease community supervision, or mandatory supervision, or after a term of custody in county jail under Pen C §1170(h)(5)(A). Pen C §§1214(b)–(c), 1202.4(m); Welf & I C §730.6(f); People v Kleinman (2004) 123 CA4th 1476, 1479–1481, 20 CR3d 885 (probation summarily revoked).

JUDICIAL TIP: Enforcement, like a judgment, should not be confused with the actual entry of a civil judgment based on the order to pay restitution. Judges should not at any time order the entry of
such a judgment. However, it is entirely proper for the judge to order the appropriate civil clerk to issue enforcement of judgment orders, such as writs of execution, to victims with a restitution order. See People v Hart (1998) 65 CA4th 902, 906, 76 CR2d 837. But see People v Farael (1999) 70 CA4th 864, 866–867, 83 CR2d 16 (on conviction of insurance fraud, court properly required defendant as condition of probation to sign confession of judgment in insurer’s favor in amount of its investigation costs; appellate court found “no practical or legal difference between a restitution order and a confession of judgment for the purpose of restitution”).

e. [§83.42] Penalty Assessments

Restitution orders are not subject to the penalty assessments of Pen C §1464 or Govt C §76000. Unlike penalty assessments, restitution is not collected by the courts, but is ordered payable directly to the victim. People v Dorsey (1999) 75 CA4th 729, 734–737, 89 CR2d 498; People v Martinez (1999) 73 CA4th 265, 267–268, 86 CR2d 346.

Statutory penalties may not be included in a victim restitution order. People v Boudames (2006) 146 CA4th 45, 49–53, 52 CR3d 629.

f. [§83.43] Administrative Fees

When a defendant is ordered to pay restitution as a condition of probation to the victim or to the Restitution Fund under Pen C §1203.1(b), the entity collecting the fee (i.e., county or trial court) may impose a fee to cover the administrative costs of collecting restitution payments made to the victim, but not those made to the fund. The fee may not exceed 15 percent of the total amount of restitution ordered to be paid. Pen C §1203.1(l); People v Eddards (2008) 162 CA4th 712, 716–717, 75 CR3d 924. Any fee that does not exceed 15 percent of the restitution amount is legally authorized, even if the fee exceeds the actual administrative cost of collection. People v Guarneros (2016) 5 CA5th 42, 50, 208 CR3d 914 (phrase in Pen C §1203.1(l) stating that the fee is “to cover the actual administrative cost of collection” describes the purpose of the fee, not a limitation on the amount of the fee).

g. [§83.44] Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity

Article I, §28(b)(13), of the California Constitution, and Pen C §1202.4(a) refer to restitution from the persons convicted of crimes. A person found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) is not a convicted person.
People v Morrison (1984) 162 CA3d 995, 998, 208 CR 800; Newman v Newman (1987) 196 CA3d 255, 259, 241 CR 712 (defendant found NGI is not “convicted” within meaning of CCP §340.3). Although there is no California case on point dealing with restitution in NGI cases, other states have ruled on the issue and concluded that there is no authority to order restitution in these cases. See State v Heartfield (Ariz 2000) 998 P2d 1080; State v Gile (Or App 1999) 985 P2d 199 (defendant found NGI not subject to assessment similar to Pen C §1202.4 restitution fine).

h. [§83.45] Effect of Acquittal

In a nonprobation context, a restitution order may not be imposed for a crime of which the defendant has been acquitted unless the defendant is convicted of another crime which also led to the victim’s losses. People v Foalima (2015) 239 CA4th 1376, 1395–1396, 192 CR3d 136; People v Percelle (2005) 126 CA4th 164, 178–180, 23 CR3d 731. However, the court may impose a restitution order as a condition of probation, regardless of whether the defendant has been convicted of the underlying crime. 126 CA4th at 169.

i. [§83.46] Abatement of Restitution Order

If a defendant dies while an appeal is pending from his or her conviction, the death permanently abates all further proceedings, including any restitution order. A victim restitution order requires a conviction for the crime that caused the victim’s loss, and the defendant’s death pending appeal unquestionably abates the defendant’s underlying convictions. People v Schaefer (2012) 208 CA4th 1283, 1287–1288, 146 CR3d 497. The Schaefer court agreed with the Attorney General that there are strong policy arguments in favor of excepting a restitution order from an abatement order, and invited the Legislature to consider the issue. 208 CA4th at 1288 n3.

2. [§83.47] Restitution Under Pen C §1202.4 and Welf & I C §730.6

Penal Code §1202.4 or its counterpart for juvenile offenders, Welf & I C §730.6, apply when all three of the following conditions are present:

(1) an economic loss suffered by a victim (see §§83.57–83.60) (victim of felony violation of Pen C §288 entitled to restitution for noneconomic losses (Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(F); see §83.75),

(2) as a result of the commission of a crime,

(3) of which the defendant was convicted (Pen C §1202.4(a)(1); see People v Carbajal (1995) 10 C4th 1114, 1122, 43 CR2d 681; People v Woods (2008) 161 CA4th 1045, 1049–1053, 74 CR3d 786.
When some of these conditions are not met, the court may have discretion to order restitution. For discussion, see §§83.106–83.113.

The causal connection embodied in the words “as the result of” in Pen C §1202.4(f)(3) is indicative of direct causation. But just as in tort law, the law must impose limitations on liability for victim restitution other than simple direct causality, or else a defendant will face infinite liability for his or her criminal acts, no matter how remote the consequence. People v Jones (2010) 187 CA4th 418, 425–427, 114 CR3d 8. Therefore, the principles of proximate causation should apply to an award of victim restitution. People v Jones, supra. See also People v Holmberg (2011) 195 CA4th 1310, 1320–1324, 125 CR3d 878 (proximate cause analyzed by substantial factor test); People v Foalima (2015) 239 CA4th 1376, 1396–1397, 192 CR3d 136.

The court must find that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the injury. It need not, however, be the sole cause. In re A.M. (2009) 173 CA4th 668, 672–674, 93 CR3d 168 (CALCRIM 240 provides test for determining whether a victim’s economic loss is “a result of the minor’s conduct” under Welf & I C §730.6).

a. [§83.48] Presentence Investigation Report

A probation officer’s presentence investigation report must include information and recommendations pertaining to restitution fines and victim restitution. Pen C §1203(b)(2)(D), (d), (g). Specifically, the report must include:

- Information concerning the victim of the crime, including the victim’s statement, the amount of the victim’s loss, and whether that loss is covered by the victim’s or defendant’s insurance (Cal Rules of Ct 4.411.5(a)(5); for discussion of the effect of insurance on restitution awards, see §§83.76–83.77);
- A statement of mandatory and recommended restitution, restitution fines, and other fines and costs to be assessed against the defendant (Cal Rules of Ct 4.411.5(a)(12)); and
- Findings concerning a defendant’s ability to make restitution and pay any fine (Cal Rules of Ct 4.411.5(a)(9), (12)).

If, as is typical in misdemeanor cases, no probation report is prepared for sentencing, the court may consider any information that could have been included in a probation report. Pen C §1203(d).

Financial evaluation. The court may order the defendant to appear before a county financial evaluation officer, if available, for an evaluation
of the defendant’s ability to make restitution. Pen C §1203(j). The county officer must report findings regarding restitution and other court-related costs to the probation officer on the question of the defendant’s ability to pay those costs. Pen C §1203(j).

b. Hearing

(1) [§83.49] Right to Hearing

Defendant. The defendant has the right to a court hearing to dispute the amount of restitution or the manner in which it is to be made. Pen C §§1202.4(f)(1), 1203(d), 1203.1k; People v Carbajal (1995) 10 C4th 1114, 1125, 43 CR2d 681. Juvenile offenders have the same right. Welf & I C §730.6(h)(2). Advisement of this right is a precondition to enforcement of the restitution order by a victim. Pen C §1214(b); for more on notice, see §83.51.

Victim. A victim has a right to appear at sentencing personally or by private counsel to express his or her views regarding restitution. Cal Const art I, §28(b)(8), (c)(1); Pen C §1191.1. This right also extends to:

- The victim’s spouse, parents, children, or guardian (Cal Const art I, §28(e); Pen C §1191.1);
- The lawful representative of the victim who is deceased, a minor, or physically or psychologically incapacitated (Cal Const art I, §28(e));
- The next of kin of a deceased victim (Pen C §1191.1);
- An insurer or employer victimized by workers’ compensation fraud (Pen C §1191.10);
- The California Victim Compensation Board when enforcing its subrogation rights (Pen C §1202.4(f)(2); see §83.89).

A victim at a restitution hearing may testify by live, two-way audio and video transmission, if such capability is available at the court. Pen C §1202.4(f)(1).

(2) [§83.50] Presence of Defendant

The defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to be present at any restitution hearing, which is considered part of sentencing and pronouncement of judgment and thus a critical stage of the criminal prosecution. Pen C §§977, 1193; Cal Const art 1, §15; People v Dehle (2008) 166 CA4th 1380, 1386, 83 CR3d 461. A defendant, however, may waive his right to be present under Pen C §1193. People v Robertson (1989) 48 C3d 18, 62, 255 CR 631. In felony cases, a defendant may
waive his or her presence in open court and on the record, or in a notarized writing. The court may also proceed in absentia in a felony case after the exercise of reasonable diligence to procure the presence of the defendant and a finding that it would be in the interest of justice to proceed. Pen C §1193(a). In a misdemeanor case, Pen C §1193(b) states that judgment may be pronounced against the defendant in his absence. However, the appellate courts have held that a misdemeanor defendant must be present at sentencing unless: (1) defendant is represented by counsel with authority to act on defendant’s behalf; (2) defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his or her right to be present; or (3) defendant has voluntarily absented himself or herself.


For best practices to avoid proceeding in absentia, see Judicial Tips in §83.85.

(3) [§83.51] Notice

Defendant. The court should inform the defendant of the right to a hearing to contest restitution. See Pen C §§1202.4(f)(1) (right to hearing), 1214(b); People v Carbajal (1995) 10 C4th 1114, 1125, 43 CR2d 681. The consequences of failing to provide this information differ depending on whether the court follows the recommendations of the probation report:

• If the court does not order more restitution than the report recommends, failure to request a hearing waives any error. People v Foster (1993) 14 CA4th 939, 949, 18 CR2d 1; People v Blankenship (1989) 213 CA3d 992, 997, 262 CR 141.

 disclaimer: This is not a formal opinion of the California Supreme Court. This is not the final version of California Code of Civil Procedure, this is the draft version for your reference.

JUDICIAL TIP: Some judges obtain an express waiver of hearing when the defendant does not contest restitution. This forestalls later objections to civil enforcement of the restitution order based on a lack of hearing.

• However, when the court exceeds the recommendations without first bringing that prospect to the defendant’s attention and affording the defendant an opportunity to contest it, the defendant has been deprived of any meaningful opportunity to be heard. See People v Sandoval (1989) 206 CA3d 1544, 1550, 254 CR 674. See also People v Thygesen (1999) 69 CA4th 988, 993, 81 CR2d 886.

JUDICIAL TIP: When the judge contemplates ordering more restitution than the probation officer recommended, the judge
should indicate this before making an order and should inquire whether the defendant desires a hearing.

**Victim.** The probation officer has the duty to notify the victim of

- All sentencing proceedings or juvenile disposition hearings,
- The right to appear, and
- The right to express his or her views. Pen C §§679.02(a)(3), 1191.1.

The probation officer must also provide the victim with timely written information concerning the court’s duty to order restitution and the victim’s

- Right to civil recovery against the defendant;
- Right to a copy of the restitution order from the court;
- Right to enforce the restitution order as a civil judgment;
- Responsibility to provide information about losses to the probation department, district attorney, and court; and
- Opportunity to be compensated from the Restitution Fund. Pen C §§679.02(a)(8), 1191.2.

**JUDICIAL TIP:** When there is no probation referral, as is often the case with misdemeanors, the prosecutor should notify the victim unless the county has another agency in charge of victim restitution that notifies victims.

In cases of juvenile offenders the obligation to notify is limited to offenses that would have been felonies if committed by an adult. Pen C §679.02(a)(4).

The California Emergency Management Agency is required to develop and make available a “notification of eligibility” card for victims and derivative victims that includes specified information about eligibility to receive payment from the Restitution Fund for losses resulting from the crime. Pen C §1191.21(a). The law enforcement officer with primary responsibility for investigating the crime and the district attorney may provide this card to the victim and any derivative victims. Pen C §1191.21(b).

**JUDICIAL TIP:** To spare victims court appearances that are unnecessary because defendant does not contest restitution, some judges initially make only uncontested orders. They continue the case when the defendant plans to challenge restitution; the victim is invited to attend the continued hearing.
(4) [§83.52] Attendance of Prosecutor

The prosecutor must be present at the restitution hearing to advocate on the People’s behalf and be heard on issues that affect a fair and just result on the question of victim restitution. *People v Dehle* (2008) 166 CA4th 1380, 1386–1389, 83 CR3d 461 (trial court erred in allowing hearing to go forward without the prosecutor; victim’s private attorney did not appear on behalf of the People, but solely on behalf of the victim). Although private counsel may assist a prosecutor (see §83.53), the prosecutor may not delegate a restitution hearing entirely to a private attorney. 166 CA4th at 1389–1390.

A prosecutor’s failure to seek restitution at the initial sentencing hearing does not preclude seeking that restitution at a later proceeding. On motion of the victim, the district attorney or on the court’s own motion, a court may at any time correct a sentence that is rendered invalid due to the omission of a restitution order under Pen C §1202.46. And the trial court may not stray from the statutory mandate of full restitution under Pen C §1202.4(f). *People v Pierce* (2015) 234 CA4th 1334, 1337–1338, 184 CR3d 607.

(5) [§83.53] Participation of Victim’s Attorney

The victim has a right to have his or her attorney appear at the restitution hearing and to be heard through counsel on the issue of restitution. Cal Const art I, §28(b)(8), (c)(1). The victim’s attorney may present evidence and argument at the hearing so long as the prosecutor is present and has the opportunity to speak if the victim’s or his or her attorney’s position diverges from the People’s interests. See *People v Smith* (2011) 198 CA4th 415, 439–440, 129 C3d 910.

(6) [§83.54] Nature of Restitution Hearing

A restitution hearing does not require the formalities of a trial. *People v Hartley* (1984) 163 CA3d 126, 130, 209 CR 131. Thus


- Defendant has no right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, including the probation officer who prepared the probation report. *People v Cain* (2000) 82 CA4th 81, 86–88, 97 CR2d 836 (no right to cross-examine psychotherapist whose fees defendant was
ordered to reimburse; trial courts, however, retain discretion to permit cross-examination on a case-by-case basis).

- The court may consider the recommendations in the presentence report despite their hearsay character (*People v Cain, supra*, 82 CA4th at 87–88; Pen C §§1203(b)(2)(D)(ii), 1203.1k), as long as the court independently determines the amount of restitution (*People v Hartley, supra*).

- The evidentiary requirements for establishing a victim’s economic losses are minimal. The court is not required to draw sentencing information “through the narrow net of courtroom evidence rules.” Rather, the court has virtually unlimited discretion as to the kind of information it can consider and the source from which it comes. *People v Prosser* (2007) 157 CA4th 682, 690–692, 68 CR3d 808 (in determining value of stolen property, court may consider testimony of victim as to its value, even though testimony was unsupported by receipts or appraisals or a detailed description of each individual stolen piece). See also Pen C §1202.4(f) (court’s determination of restitution based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court).

- Documentary evidence such as bills, receipts, repair estimates, insurance payment statements, payroll stubs, business records, and similar documents relevant to the value of stolen or damaged property, medical expenses, and wages and profits lost may not be excluded as hearsay evidence. Pen C §1203.1d(d).

**JUDICIAL TIP:** Restitution hearings should not further victimize victims by long courtroom waits or multiple hearings. This problem often arises in misdemeanor cases that involve long calendars and that lack probation reports. To minimize delays for victims some judges

- Instruct courtroom clerks to ascertain cases in which victims are present and call these cases first; and

- Permit victims to present restitution information without delay when an out-of-custody defendant is absent, on a determination and finding that defendant’s absence is voluntary and with knowledge of the hearing. See Pen C §1043 for a similar procedure at trial. Merely asking the victim to hand papers to the clerk and deferring the restitution determination may create confusion and an inadequate record.
§83.56

(7) [§83.55] Burden of Proof

The victim must present evidence showing that there were losses and that the losses were caused by the crime committed by the defendant. People v Fulton (2003) 109 CA4th 876, 885–886, 135 CR2d 466. However, absent a victim’s claim for restitution, the prosecutor has authority to seek restitution on behalf of the victim. Penal Code §1202.4(f) uses disjunctive language to indicate that the amount of restitution may be based either on the “amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims” or “any other showing to the court,” suggesting that a victim’s claim is not a precondition for the issuance of a restitution order. People v Selivanov (2016) 5 CA5th 726, 783–785, 210 CR3d 117. See also People v Lehman (2016) 247 CA4th 795, 805, 202 CR3d 386 (prosecutor requested noneconomic restitution on behalf of sexual assault victim).

The amount of restitution must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. People v Gemelli (2008) 161 CA4th 1539, 1542–1543, 74 CR3d 901. Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of economic losses, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount of the claimed losses. 161 CA4th at 1543. The defendant has the burden of showing that the restitution recommendation in the probation report or the victims’ estimates are inaccurate. People v Foster (1993) 14 CA4th 939, 946, 18 CR2d 1.

c. [§83.56] Ability To Pay

Defendant’s inability to pay cannot be considered in determining the amount of restitution. Pen C §1202.4(g).

However, ability to pay is vital in two other respects:

(1) At the time of making the restitution order the court needs to make an ability-to-pay determination in order to decide whether to make an income deduction order. Pen C §1202.42(a); for discussion, see §83.93.

(2) Ability to pay becomes important if the defendant fails to pay restitution; it is a precondition to revoking probation or imprisoning defendant for failure to pay. Pen C §1203.2(a); People v Whisenand (1995) 37 CA4th 1383, 1393, 44 CR2d 501; for discussion, see §83.88.
d. Persons Entitled to Restitution

(1) Victims

(a) [§83.57] Constitutional Definition of Victim

The California Constitution provides a definition of a victim, including for purposes of restitution. Under the constitutional definition, a “victim” is (Cal Const art I, §28(e)):

- A person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act.
- The person’s spouse, parents, children, siblings, or guardian.
- A lawful representative of a crime victim who is deceased, a minor, or physically or psychologically incapacitated. For discussion of executor’s right to collect restitution on behalf of deceased victim, see §83.74.

The term “victim” does not include a person in custody for an offense, the accused, or a person whom the court finds would not act in the best interests of a minor victim. Cal Const art I, §28(e).

(b) [§83.58] Statutory Definition Under Pen C §1202.4

A “victim” under Pen C §1202.4 is any individual who has suffered economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime of which the defendant was convicted. Pen C §1202.4(a)(1). Other individuals entitled to restitution under Pen C §1202.4 include:

- The immediate surviving family of the actual victim. Pen C §1202.4(k)(1).
- Parents and guardians of a victim who is a minor. Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(D) and (E); for discussion, see §83.65.
- A person who has sustained economic loss as the result of a crime and who satisfies any of the following conditions (Pen C §1202.4(k)(3)):
  — At the time of the crime was the parent, grandparent, sibling, spouse, child, or grandchild of the victim.
  — At the time of the crime was living in the victim’s household.
  — At the time of the crime was a person who had previously lived in the victim’s household for at least 2 years in a relationship substantially similar to that of a parent, grandparent, sibling, spouse, child, or grandchild.
— Is another family member of the victim, including, but not limited to, the victim’s fiancé or fiancée, and who witnessed the crime.

— Is the primary caretaker of a minor victim.

- A person who is eligible to receive assistance from the Restitution Fund under the California Victim Compensation Program (Govt C §§13950–13969.7). Pen C §1202.4(k)(4).

For discussion of restitution payments to the state Restitution Fund, see §83.89.

A victim of crime does not have to be an individual. A corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government and governmental agency, or any other legal or commercial entity may be entitled to restitution under Pen C §1202.4 if it is a “direct victim” of a crime, i.e., it is the immediate object of the offense or it is an entity against which the crime has been committed. Pen C §1202.4(k)(2); People v Martinez (2005) 36 C4th 384, 393, 30 CR3d 779. For example:

- A water company was entitled to restitution in the amount of money embezzled by defendant plus penalties and interest assessed by the IRS resulting from defendant’s failure to pay company’s payroll taxes. People v Williams (2010) 184 CA4th 142, 147–149, 108 CR3d 772.

- A bank was direct victim, entitled to restitution, when defendant forged checks drawn on the bank. People v Bartell (2009) 170 CA4th 1258, 1261–1262, 88 CR3d 844.

- A utility company was entitled to restitution for value of illegally diverted electrical power used in marijuana growing operation. People v Phu (2009) 179 CA4th 280, 283–285, 101 CR3d 601.

- A bank was entitled to restitution for its losses from a defendant whose fraudulent transactions affected a deposit holder’s account; the bank was a direct victim because the bank did not act as an indemnitor, the bank was the object of the crime, and the defendant pleaded guilty to “commercial” burglary. People v Saint-Amans (2005) 131 CA4th 1076, 1084–1087, 32 CR3d 518.

Compare People v Slattery (2008) 167 CA4th 1091, 1096–1097, 84 CR3d 672 (hospital that treated victim injured by criminal conduct is not a direct victim).

확장 팁: 재무사가 다른 법률을 제시할 때에는 주의를 기울이는 것이 좋습니다.
is a victim. See, e.g., a narrower definition in Govt C §§13951(c), (g), 13955, dealing with persons entitled to compensation from the Restitution Fund, and Pen C §1191.10. These definitions do not limit who qualifies as a victim under Pen C §1202.4. See, e.g., People v Broussard (1993) 5 C4th 1067, 1077, 22 CR2d 1078 (persons entitled to restitution not limited to those who qualify for assistance from Restitution Fund); People v Valdez (1994) 24 CA4th 1194, 1199, 30 CR2d 4.

(2) §83.59 Governmental Agencies

A governmental agency may be a direct victim of the defendant’s crime under Pen C §1202.4(k)(2). For example, a defrauded governmental agency is a direct victim entitled to restitution for its losses. See People v Crow (1993) 6 C4th 952, 957, 26 CR2d 1 (welfare fraud); People v Akins (2005) 128 CA4th 1376, 1382, 27 CR3d 815 (welfare fraud); People v Hudson (2003) 113 CA4th 924, 927–930, 7 CR3d 114 (discussion of how to calculate restitution to defrauded government agency). See also In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 CA4th 1128, 1132–1135, 123 CR2d 316 (school district is direct victim entitled to restitution from minor who vandalized school property in amount that included reimbursement for property damage and labor costs of salaried employees who repaired the damage).

A governmental agency that is responsible for repairing, replacing, or restoring public or privately owned property that has been defaced with graffiti or other inscribed material, as defined in Pen C §594(e), is entitled to restitution for economic losses sustained as the result of a violation of Pen C §594, §594.3, §594.4, §640.5, §640.6, or §640.7. Pen C §1202.4(k)(5). These losses include the cost of materials and equipment used in the cleanup and repair and the labor cost for public works personnel who clean up the graffiti. See In re Johnny M., supra. Restitution awards to government agencies for a minor's acts of graffiti are expressly authorized by two statutory schemes. The general statute, Welf & I C §730.6(h), authorizes full restitution for economic losses, including the actual cost of repairing damaged property where repair is possible. Awards under Welf & I C §730.6 require proof of damage actually linked to the minor's conduct. In contrast, the Graffiti Removal and Damage Recovery Program (Welf & I C §742.10 et seq) authorizes restitution based on a city’s average costs for graffiti investigation and remediation. See Luis M. v Superior Court (2014) 59 C4th 300, 305–306, 173 CR3d 37.

Governmental units are often indirect victims, not entitled to restitution. For example:

• A law enforcement agency that bought illicit drugs from the defendant does not qualify for restitution for the funds expended.
People v Torres (1997) 59 CA4th 1, 4–5, 68 CR2d 644 (overhead expenses costs incurred in the course of regular investigatory duties not recoverable).

- A public agency may not be awarded restitution for cleanup costs incurred in removing hazardous waste from a defendant’s illegal drug lab. People v Martinez (2005) 36 C4th 384, 391–394, 30 CR3d 779 (Health & S C §§11470.1 and 11470.2 provide exclusive means by which Department of Toxic Substances Control can recover costs).

- A city may not be awarded restitution for workers’ compensation payments to a police officer who was injured by defendant’s criminal act. People v Franco (1993) 19 CA4th 175, 183–186, 23 CR2d 475 (city may pursue civil action under Lab C §3852 to collect restitution).

- A county animal welfare agency is not entitled to restitution under Pen C §1202.4 for the costs of caring for neglected and abused animals. People v Brunette (2011) 194 CA4th 268, 280, 124 CR3d 521 (agency may recover costs under Pen C §597).

- A public agency may not be awarded restitution under Pen C §1202.4 for costs to investigate crimes or apprehend criminals. People v Ozkan (2004) 124 CA4th 1072, 1076–1077, 21 CR3d 854 (Board of Equalization entitled to recover costs under Bus & P C §12015.5).

As illustrated in some of the above cases, statutes often give governmental agencies other remedies to obtain reimbursement for expenditures attributable to defendant’s conduct. Other examples include:

- **Emergency response to DUI auto accident.** The court may, as a condition of probation, order restitution to a public agency for expenses incurred in its emergency response to a DUI auto accident. Govt C §53150; Pen C §§1203.1(e), 1203.1/l. See California Highway Patrol v Superior Court (2006) 135 CA4th 488, 497–509, 38 CR3d 16 (discussion of recoverable emergency response costs under Govt C §53150).

- **Fire suppression.** Fire departments can receive restitution expenses incurred in putting out a fire that was negligently or unlawfully set. Related rescue and emergency medical costs are also recoverable. Health & S C §13009.
• **Medical examination.** The court may order restitution to a law enforcement agency for the cost of a medical examination conducted in child abuse or neglect cases and in sexual assault cases. Pen C §1203.1h.

• **Medical or psychological treatment of minor sexual assault victim.** The court must, as a condition of probation, order a defendant convicted of sexual assault on a minor to pay restitution for the costs of medical or psychological treatment incurred by the victim. Pen C §1203.1g.

• **Medical or psychological treatment of elderly sexual assault victim.** The court must, as a condition of probation, order a defendant convicted of assault, battery, or aggravated assault on a victim 65 years of age or older to pay restitution for the costs of medical or psychological treatment incurred by the victim. Pen C §1203.1j.

• **Emergency response.** The court may, as a condition of probation, order restitution to a public agency for costs incurred due to its response to an emergency. Pen C §1203.1l.

• **Child stealing cases.** The court must order the payment of restitution to the district attorney for any costs incurred in locating and returning a child to the custodial parent. Pen C §278.6(c); Fam C §3134.

• **Criminal threat cases.** The court must order payment to a public or private entity for costs incurred for any personnel, equipment, material, or cleanup costs, or for any property damage, caused by a false bomb threat or a false threat to use a weapon of mass destruction, or any emergency response to such threats. Pen C §422.1.

• **Damage to public property.** The court must order payment of restitution to a public entity for costs of cleanup, repair, replacement, or restoration of public property damaged by parties who refused to comply with an order to disperse. Pen C §416(b).

A governmental agency may be the beneficiary of restitution under Pen C §1203.1 (restitution imposed as condition of probation) for losses resulting from unusual expenses directly incurred because of defendant’s criminal conduct. *People v Rugamas* (2001) 93 CA4th 518, 521–523, 113 CR2d 271 (court upheld restitution order requiring defendant to reimburse police department for medical expenses incurred to treat defendant after police shot him with rubber bullets). For discussion, see §83.106.
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(3) [§83.60] Insurance Companies

An insurance company that has paid the crime losses of its insured under the terms of an insurance policy is not a direct victim of crime and has no right to restitution. People v Birkett (1999) 21 C4th 226, 231, 245, 87 CR2d 205 (court also lacks discretion to divide restitution between victim and insurer). However, when the defendant is convicted of submitting false claims to an insurance company, the insurance company is considered to be a direct victim of the defendant’s crime and thus entitled to restitution. People v O’Casey (2001) 88 CA4th 967, 971–972, 106 CR2d 263 (workers compensation fraud); People v Moloy (2000) 84 CA4th 257, 261, 100 CR2d 676. Compare People v Busser (2010) 186 CA4th 1503, 1509–1511, 113 CR3d 536 (auto insurer was not entitled to restitution for repair costs from a hit-and-run accident involving defendant convicted of presenting a materially false statement to the insurer about the facts of the accident; insurer was contractually obligated to pay the repair costs even if the defendant had not lied).

In People v Petronella (2013) 218 CA4th 945, 969, 160 CR3d 144, the defendant knowingly and repeatedly underreported his payroll to reduce the workers’ compensation premium owed to the State Compensation Insurance Fund. The court held that the willful underpayment of insurance premiums constitutes a recoverable economic loss under Pen C §1202.4.

e. Losses Subject to Restitution; Amount

(1) [§83.61] Full Restitution for Economic Losses

Penal Code §1202.4 requires
(a) full restitution
(b) for economic losses determined by the court. Pen C §1202.4(a)(1), (f)(3).

Two kinds of losses not covered by Pen C §1202.4 are:

• Noneconomic losses (e.g., psychological harm) except those suffered by victims of felony violations of Pen C §288 (see §83.75).
• Losses that did not result from the crime of which defendant was convicted. Pen C §1202.4(a)(1), (f)(3)(F); for basis of restitution other than Pen C §1202.4, see §§83.106–83.113.
(2) [§83.62] Components of Economic Loss

Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3) lists a number of losses and expenditures that qualify as recoverable economic losses. The list is not inclusive; the statute provides broad discretion with respect to the type of losses subject to a restitution order. Pen C §1202.4(f)(3) (“losses . . . including, but not limited to . . .”); In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 CA4th 1128, 1135–1136, 123 CR2d 316; In re M.W. (2008) 169 CA4th 1, 5–6, 86 CR3d 545 (list of losses enumerated in Welf & F C §730.6(h)(1) is not inclusive). See, e.g., People v Keichler (2005) 129 CA4th 1039, 1046–1047, 29 CR3d 120 (trial court properly ordered restitution for the cost of a traditional Hmong healing ceremony and herbal medicines to victims of a fight). See also §83.69 (support to victims’ children).

(a) [§83.63] Property Damages or Loss

Damaged property. Victims have a right to restitution “for the value of stolen or damaged property,” defined as the replacement cost of like property or the cost of repairing it when repair is possible. Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(A).

Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3)(A) does not require that the restitution for damaged property should be the lesser of the replacement cost or the actual repair cost of the property. The choice is left to the sound discretion of the court. People v Stanley (2012) 54 C4th 734, 737, 143 CR3d 260.

Stolen property. For most types of stolen property, original cost is a fair approximation of replacement cost. People v Foster (1993) 14 CA4th 939, 946, 18 CR2d 1. Accordingly, the court may consider a victim’s statement of what the property cost, as set out in the probation report. It is up to the defendant to contest the valuation. People v Foster, supra. If stolen property is recovered and returned to the victim, the victim is only entitled to the diminution in the value of the property. People v Chappelone (2010) 183 CA4th 1159, 1180–1182, 107 CR3d 895 (calculation of victim restitution awarded to department store for the loss of damaged retail merchandise that was stolen by employee).

Appreciated property. When the value of stolen property appreciates after the theft, as may happen with securities, the court may order restitution in the amount of the appreciated value. See People v Tucker (1995) 37 CA4th 1, 4–6, 44 CR2d 1 (embezzled mutual fund shares; decision based on former Pen C §1203.04).

★ JUDICIAL TIP: The converse is not true in the view of most judges. When shares decline in value after defendant embezzled them, defendant should not get a windfall; defendant’s crime deprived the victim of the opportunity to sell the shares before their value dropped.
Application of other statutes to determine loss. In People v Baker (2005) 126 CA4th 463, 468–470, 23 CR3d 871, a defendant was convicted of cattle theft and was ordered to make restitution for the stolen cows and for the calves that were born while the cows were misappropriated. In calculating the restitution owed, the trial court properly applied Food & A C §21855 in quadrupling the restitution amount. 126 CA4th at 469–470.

(b) [§83.64] Medical and Counseling Expenses

Medical expenses are a proper item of restitution (Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(B)) and include future expenses. People v Phelps (1996) 41 CA4th 946, 949–951, 48 CR2d 855. Victims also have a right to restitution for mental health counseling expenses. Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(C); People v O’Neal (2004) 122 CA4th 817, 820–821, 19 CR3d 202 (defendant convicted of sexual molestation ordered to pay restitution for psychological counseling expenses incurred by victim’s brother); In re M.W. (2008) 169 CA4th 1, 4–7, 86 CR3d 545 (cost of mental health services incurred by victim of crime committed by a juvenile is a recoverable loss under Welf & I C §730.6(h)).

Other statutes provide for restitution of medical and counseling expenses in specific situations. For example:

• Defendants convicted of the following offenses may be ordered to reimburse a victim for reasonable costs of counseling and other reasonable expenses as condition of probation:
  — Domestic battery (see Pen C §243(e)(2)(B)),
  — Spousal rape (see Pen C §262(d)(2)),
  — Spousal abuse (see Pen C §273.5(i)(2)(A)), and
  — Violation of protective order (see Pen C §273.6(h)(2)).

• Defendants convicted of sexual assault on a minor are required to make restitution for the victim’s medical or psychological treatment expenses. Pen C §1203.1g.

• Defendants convicted of sexual assault on an elderly person are required to make restitution for the victim’s medical or psychological treatment expenses. Pen C §1203.1j.

A crime victim seeking restitution for the cost of therapy, unlike a civil plaintiff, does not waive his or her psychotherapist-patient privilege. People v Garcia (2010) 185 CA4th 1203, 1210–1213, 111 CR3d 435.

A crime victim may not order the district attorney’s office to negotiate with a victim’s medical provider concerning the victim’s
medical bills. Nothing in the Hospital Fair Pricing Act (Health & S C §§127400 et seq) requires a patient to seek a discount for his or her medical bills or suggests that the court has the authority to order the patient or district attorney to do so. People v Superior Court (Lauren M.) (2011) 196 CA4th 1221, 1225, 127 CR3d 154.

For a discussion of restitution for medical expenses when the victim is covered by private medical insurance or Medi-Cal, see §83.78.

(c) [§83.65] Lost Wages and Profits; Out-of-Pocket Expenses

Wages or profits lost by the victim as a result of the crime are a proper item of restitution. Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(D)–(E).

Restitution should include:

• Future lost wages. See People v Millard (2009) 175 CA4th 7, 29–30, 95 CR3d 751 (future earnings based on the number of years the victim otherwise would have continued to work and the amount of annual income the victim would have expected to receive); People v Fulton (2003) 109 CA4th 876, 880 n2, 887, 135 CR2d 466 (lost wages associated with future postsurgery recovery). An award for future lost wages must take into account the time value of money. People v Pangan (2013) 213 CA4th 574, 581–582, 152 CR3d 364 (trial court has no sua sponte duty to account for the time value of money).

• Profits or wages lost because of time spent as a witness. Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(E); People v Nguyen (1994) 23 CA4th 32, 45, 28 CR2d 140.


• Wages or profits lost by the parents or guardian of a victim who is a minor. Pen C §§1202.4(f)(3)(D) (loss while caring for injured minor), 1202.4(f)(3)(E) (loss because of time spent as witness or assisting prosecution).

• Wages lost because of psychological injury. People v Brasure (2008) 42 C4th 1037, 1074–1075, 71 CR3d 675 (Pen C §1202.4(f)(3) applied to compensate a murder victim’s mother for 2 years’ lost wages due to the trauma of her son’s death; the statute does not distinguish between economic losses covered by physical injuries and those caused by psychological trauma).

• Lost wages incurred by victim or victim’s family for time spent attending trial proceedings. People v Moore (2009) 177 CA4th
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1229, 1231–1233, 99 CR3d 555 (victim entitled to restitution even if the victim is just a spectator and does not testify); People v Crisler (2008) 165 CA4th 1503, 1507–1509, 81 CR3d 887 (trial court ordered restitution for time spent by mother, father, and stepfather of a minor murder victim to attend the defendant’s murder trial).

• Incidental expenses incurred by victim’s family to attend trial. 165 CA4th at 1509 (parking and mileage).

• Sick leave if victim is unable to go to work because of injuries inflicted by the defendant. In re K.F. (2009) 173 CA4th 655, 665–666, 92 CR3d 784.

Lost wages include commission income as well as base wages. Commission income must be established by evidence of this income during the 12-month period before the date of the crime for which the court is ordering restitution, unless good cause for a shorter time period is shown. Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(D)–(E).

(d) [§83.66] Diminished or Lost Stream of Future Pension Payments

The court may order a defendant to pay restitution for any decrease in a victim’s pension payments when the victim’s injuries from the crime have forced the victim to retire early. People v Pangan (2013) 213 CA4th 574, 578–582, 152 CR3d 632. In awarding a lump sum payment for future loss of income, the court must calculate the time value of money, i.e. discounting the lump sum award to its present value. It is an abuse of discretion not to account for the time value of money in determining a victim’s economic loss based on a diminished or lost stream of future payments. 213 CA4th at 581–582. But see People v Arce (2014) 226 CA4th 924, 931 n9, 172 CR3d 364 (trial court has no sua sponte duty to account for the time value of money).

(e) [§83.67] Lost Work Product

A restitution award may include the reasonable value of employee work product lost as a result of the crime. In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 CA4th 1128, 1134, 123 CR2d 316. In In re Johnny M., a minor admitted to vandalizing school property. Several salaried school employees were required to spend time repairing the damage to the classrooms. The juvenile court held that the school district incurred an economic loss because the district was deprived of the work product the salaried employees would
have generated if they had not been obliged to repair school property. The court reasonably valued the lost work product at the salary rate of the district employees, including benefits, for the lost time. *In re Johnny M.*, *supra*.

(f) [§83.68] Future Economic Losses of Spouse of Deceased Victim

The court may order the defendant to pay restitution to compensate the spouse of a deceased victim for the spouse’s future economic losses attributable to the deceased victim’s death. *People v Giordano* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 644, 652, 68 CR3d 51. In support of its decision, the Supreme Court looked to the state’s wrongful death statutes that allow a spouse of a person wrongfully killed to seek compensation for the loss of financial benefits the decedent was contributing to support his or her family at the time of the decedent’s death and the loss of that support that was reasonably expected in the future. The Court stated that when the Legislature enacted Pen C §1202.4, “it did so with the presumed knowledge that courts have long understood that a surviving spouse incur an economic loss upon the death of his or her spouse.” 42 Cal. 4th at 659.

In calculating the loss of support, the trial court should consider the earning history of the deceased spouse, the age of the survivor and decedent, and the degree to which the decedent’s income provided support to the survivor’s household. These factors are not an exhaustive list; the trial court has discretion to be guided by the particular factors in each individual claim. 42 Cal. 4th at 665.

JUDICIAL TIP: When issuing a restitution order that includes future support, the court must take into account the time value of money. That is, the court must determine and apply the correct discount rate by which to reduce future economic support to a present, lump-sum value. *People v Pangan* (2013) 213 Cal. App. 4th 574, 578–582, 152 CR3d 632. But see *People v Arce* (2014) 226 Cal. App. 4th 924, 931 n9, 172 CR3d 364 (trial court has no sua sponte duty to account for the time value of money).

(g) [§83.69] Child Support to Victims’ Children

The children of a homicide victim are entitled to restitution for the loss of support. *People v Harvest* (2000) 84 Cal. 4th 641, 652–653, 101 CR2d 135 (defendant ordered to pay child support for murder victim’s children); *People v Clark* (1982) 130 Cal. App. 3d 371, 386–387, 181 CR 682 (court ordered defendant to make monthly support payments to the children of a manslaughter victim as condition or probation). The court
may also order restitution to the Restitution Fund for support to widows and children paid by the Fund. See Govt C §13957.5(a)(4).

**JUDICIAL TIP:** When issuing a restitution order which includes future support, the court must take into account the time value of money. That is, the court must determine and apply the correct discount rate by which to reduce future economic support to a present, lump-sum value. *People v Pangan* (2013) 213 Cal. App. 4th 574, 578–582, 152 CR3d 632. But see *People v Arce* (2014) 226 CA4th 924, 931 n9, 172 CR3d 364 (trial court has no sua sponte duty to account for the time value of money).

**(h) [§83.70] Interest**

The court must award interest on a restitution order under Pen C §1202.4 at the rate of 10 percent per year. Pen C §§1202.4(f)(3)(G), 1214.5. The court has the option of awarding interest from the date of sentencing or loss. Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(G). See *People v Wickham* (2013) 222 CA4th 232, 237, 165 CR3d 506 (victim of theft by false pretenses was entitled to recover prejudgment interest of 10 percent on promissory notes he executed in favor of defendant, notwithstanding that the notes stated usurious interest rates above the legal limit).

**JUDICIAL TIPS:**

- The latter is most workable when there is a single loss. Many judges leave it to the probation officer or other county agency to factor interest into a payment schedule.
- The court has additional options with respect to awarding interest on restitution ordered as a condition of probation. The court may award interest from the date of the entry of the judgment or order. Pen C §1214.5(b)(1). If restitution is payable in installments, interest commences to accrue as to each installment on the date the installment becomes due. Pen C §1214.5(b)(2).

**(i) [§83.71] Attorney’s Fees**

Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3)(H) mandates restitution for actual and reasonable attorney’s fees “and other costs of collection accrued by a private entity on behalf of the victim.” See *People v Maheshwari* (2003) 107 CA4th 1406, 1409–1411, 132 CR2d 903 (defendant convicted of embezzlement ordered to pay victim’s attorney’s fees and private investigator fees incurred in civil action to determine the amount of and
recover embezzled funds). Only those attorney’s fees attributable to the victim’s recovery of economic damages are allowed under Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(H). The victim, however, is entitled to full reimbursement for attorney’s fees incurred to recover both economic and noneconomic losses when the fees cannot be reasonably divided. *People v Fulton* (2003) 109 CA4th 876, 882–885, 135 CR2d 466.

The Courts of Appeal are in disagreement as to whether a court may order restitution for a contingency fee paid by the victim without first determining whether the fee was reasonable under the lodestar method for calculating attorney’s fees. Compare *People v Taylor* (2011) 197 CA4th 757, 760–764, 128 CR3d 399 (yes); *People v Millard* (2009) 175 CA4th 7, 30–33, 95 CR3d 751 (no). The lodestar method calculation involves multiplying the reasonable number of hours worked on the case by the reasonable hourly rate for that work, and then adjusting the amount upward or downward based on specified factors to arrive at a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. 175 CA4th at 32.

A contingent fee paid by the victim to an attorney to pursue civil liability is recoverable under Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(H). *People v Pinedo* (1998) 60 CA4th 1403, 1405–1407, 71 CR2d 151. Restitution is also proper for attorney’s fees incurred to prevent a dispersal of assets by defendant. *People v Lyon* (1996) 49 CA4th 1521, 1525, 57 CR2d 415. However, legal expenses related to opposing discovery in the criminal case are not allowable. 49 C4th at 1525–1526.

Restitution may be awarded for legal fees incurred by a defendant’s employer to resolve a medical claim for a fraudulent work injury filed by the defendant. *People v Beaver* (2010) 186 CA4th 107, 128–129, 111 CR3d 726 (legal expenses to determine which type of insurance applied to loss caused by the defendant).

Although Welf & I C §730.6 does not include legal fees and costs in its list of compensable economic losses, the Second District Court of Appeal has held that a juvenile offender can be ordered to pay restitution for the legal fees and costs that the victim incurred to collect restitution. *In re Imran Q.* (2008) 158 CA4th 1316, 1319–1321, 71 CR3d 121 (Welf & I C §730.6’s silence on attorney’s fees and costs is a mere legislative oversight; trial court should utilize procedure discussed in *People v Fulton*, supra, for allocating fees).

**[§83.72] Losses From Audio and Video Piracy**

A defendant convicted of audio or video piracy under Pen C §§350, 653h, 653s, 653u, 653w, or 653aa that involves a recording or audiovisual work must make restitution to an owner or lawful producer, or trade association acting on behalf of the owner or lawful producer, of a
phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film, or other device or article from which sounds or visual images are derived that suffered economic loss resulting from the violation. Pen C §1202.4(r). The order of restitution must be based on the aggregate wholesale value of lawfully manufactured and authorized devices or articles from which sounds or visual images are devised corresponding to the number of nonconforming devices or articles involved in the offense unless a higher value can be proved in the case of (A) an unreleased audio work or (B) an audiovisual work that, at the time of unauthorized distribution, has not been made available in copies for sale to the general public in the United States on a digital versatile disc. For purposes of this subdivision, possession of nonconforming devices or articles intended for sale constitutes actual economic loss to an owner or lawful producer in the form of displaced legitimate wholesale purchases. Pen C §1202.4(r).

The order of restitution must also include reasonable costs incurred as a result of an investigation of the violation undertaken by the owner, lawful producer, or trade association acting on behalf of the owner or lawful producer. “Aggregate wholesale value” means the average wholesale value of lawfully manufactured and authorized sound or audiovisual recordings. Proof of the specific wholesale value of each nonconforming device or article is not required. Pen C §1202.4(r).

(k) [§83.73] Other Expenses

Relocation expenses. Adult victims have a right to restitution for expenses in relocating away from the defendant, including, but not limited to, deposits for utilities and telephone service, deposits for rental housing, temporary lodging and food expenses, and expenses for clothing and personal items. Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(I). These expenses must be verified by law enforcement to be necessary for the victim’s personal safety or by a mental health treatment provider to be necessary for the victim’s emotional well-being. Pen C §1202.4(f)(3)(I). See People v Mearns (2002) 97 CA4th 493, 501–502, 118 CR2d 511 (court properly ordered relocation expenses to rape victim in the amount of difference between the sale price of the victim’s original mobile home where the rape occurred and the purchase price of a new one).

Residential security expenses. Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3)(J) mandates restitution for expenses to install or increase residential security related to any violent felony (as defined in Pen C §667.5(c)), including, but not limited to, a home security device or system, or replacing or increasing the number of locks.
Residence and/or vehicle retrofitting expenses. Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3)(K) requires restitution for expenses to retrofit a residence or vehicle, or both, to make the residence accessible to, or the vehicle operational by, the victim, if the victim is permanently disabled, whether the disability is partial or total, as a direct result of the crime.

Identity theft expenses. Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3)(L) requires restitution for expenses to monitor an identity theft victim’s credit report and to repair the victim’s credit for a period of time reasonably necessary to make the victim whole.

(3) [§83.74] Payment to Estate of Deceased Victim

The estate of a victim who died as a result of a crime is not a direct victim entitled to restitution on its own behalf. Nonetheless, a deceased victim’s estate may, in appropriate cases, receive restitution in a different capacity and for a different reason. When the actual victim of a crime has died, the estate, acting in the decedent’s stead, steps into the decedent’s shoes to collect restitution owed to the decedent. Thus, a decedent’s estate or, more precisely, its executor or administrator as the decedent’s personal representative, is a proper recipient, on the decedent’s behalf, of restitution owed to the decedent, as an actual and immediate crime victim, for economic losses the decedent personally incurred. People v Runyan (2012) 54 C4th 849, 856–859, 143 CR3d 674; People v Jessee (2013) 222 CA4th 501, 508–509, 165 CR3d 280.

Restitution may only be awarded for those economic losses sustained by the decedent before his or her death. After the actual victim has died, the victim does not incur or continue to incur personal economic loss subject to mandatory restitution. 54 C4th at 859–866. In Runyan, for example, a trial court improperly ordered the defendant to pay restitution for the death-related loss in value of decedent’s business and property as well as for probate, estate administration, and funeral expenses. The Runyan court stated that the Legislature is not precluded from providing for post-death economic losses and invited it to decide whether restitutionary recovery should include injury and loss resulting from the defendant’s criminal conduct, even when the crime victim dies quickly and leaves no survivors to seek restitution on their own behalf. 54 C4th at 867.

(4) [§83.75] Noneconomic Losses in Molestation Cases

Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3)(F) provides for the recovery of noneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological harm, caused by a felony violation of Pen C §288 (lewd act on child or dependent adult). Noneconomic damages are subjective, nonmonetary losses, including, but not limited to, pain, mental suffering, and emotional
§83.76

Restitution

Inability to pay. For discussion, see §83.56.

Victim's insurance. A victim is entitled to restitution regardless of whether the victim has submitted an insurance claim or has been partially or fully reimbursed by his or her insurer. People v Birkett (1999) 21 C4th 226, 245–247, 87 CR2d 205. The amount that a victim paid as a deductible under his or her insurance contract is not the measure of restitution. Rather, it is the full amount of loss, including the total amount that the victim’s insurance company paid out plus the victim’s deductible payments, and any other amounts not covered by the victim’s insurance. See In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 CA4th 1381, 1386–1390, 122 CR2d 376.

Bankruptcy. For discussion, see §83.40.

Third-party rights. Third-party indemnification or subrogation rights do not affect the amount of restitution that is to be ordered. Pen C §1202.4(f)(2); People v Hove (1999) 76 CA4th 1266, 1272–1273, 91 CR2d 128 (court properly ordered restitution in full amount of medical expenses even though victim had not incurred any actual economic losses because of coverage by Medicare and/or Medi-Cal benefits).

Victim’s release of liability. A victim’s release of liability to the defendant’s insurance company as part of a settlement does not release the
defendant from his or her restitution obligation. A release cannot waive the
victim’s right to have a defendant pay restitution ordered as part of the
sentence. The victim would be in an untenable position if he or she had to
reject a settlement offer from the defendant’s insurance company that
covers only a portion of the victim’s losses in order to preserve the uncer-
tain possibility that the full amount might be recovered. People v Bernal
(2002) 101 CA4th 155, 160–161, 123 CR2d 622. See also In re Tommy A.
(2005) 131 CA4th 1580, 1592, 33 CR3d 103 (minor defendant’s
restitution order based on a plea agreement created an implied agreement
between the minor and the state obligating the minor to satisfy a
“rehabilitative and deterrent debt to society” by paying restitution; the
victim, not being a party to the implied agreement, could not release the
minor from court-ordered restitution under Welf & I C §730.6(a)(1)).
However, a victim’s release of claims against the parent or guardian of a
minor for damages inflicted during the minor’s commission of a crime
releases the parent or guardian. In re Michael S. (2007) 147 CA4th 1443,
1451–1455, 54 CR3d 920.

Prison sentence. For discussion, see §83.95.

(6) [§83.77] Payment by Defendant’s Insurer

If the defendant’s insurer has made payments to the victim for losses
subject to a Pen C §1202.4 restitution order, those payments must be offset
against the defendant’s restitution obligation. People v Bernal (2002) 101

An insurer’s payment to the victim must be made on behalf of the
defendant as a result of the defendant’s status as an insured under the
(defendant was entitled to an offset for a settlement payment made by
defendant’s employer’s liability insurer to victim of defendant’s DUI
accident involving company vehicle; even though defendant did not
procure policy or make premium payments, he was member of class of
insureds covered under the policy); People v Jennings (2005) 128 CA4th
42, 53–58, 26 CR3d 709 (defendant was entitled to an offset for an
insurance settlement payment when both defendant and a parent were
named on policy; it is irrelevant whether defendant or parent paid the
premiums). Compare People v Hamilton (2004) 114 CA4th 932, 941–943,
8 CR3d 190 (payments made by insurer of defendant’s parent to settle
victim’s civil action against both the defendant and parent may not offset
defendant’s restitution obligation when payments are made on parent’s
behalf and not directly on behalf of defendant); In re Tommy A. (2005) 131
CA4th 1580, 1590–1592, 33 CR3d 103 (juvenile committed hit-and-run
accident while driving another person’s car without permission; settlement
payment by owner’s insurer was “completely distinct and independent from the minor” and therefore could not be offset against minor’s restitution obligation).

When offsetting a defendant’s restitution obligations by the amount of a civil settlement, the court must determine what portion of the settlement payment is directed to cover economic losses outlined in the restitution order. Only that portion of settlement may be used to reduce the defendant’s obligations. *People v Short*, *supra*, 160 CA4th at 905; *People v Jennings*, *supra*, 128 CA4th at 58–59.

(7) [§83.78] Payment of Medical Expenses by Private Insurer or Medi-Cal

Restitution for medical expenses is the amount that the victim’s medical provider accepts from the victim’s insurer as full payment for their services, plus the deductible paid by victim, rather than the amount billed by the medical provider. *People v Duong* (2010) 180 CA4th 1533, 1536–1540, 103 CR3d 678; *People v Millard* (2009) 175 CA4th 7, 27–29, 95 CR3d 751; *In re Eric S.* (2010) 183 CA4th 1560, 1563–1566, 108 CR3d 450 (reasoning of *Duong* applied to victim restitution ordered in wardship case under Welf & I C §730.6). Compare *People v Garcia* (2010) 185 CA4th 1203, 1214–1217, 111 CR3d 435 (victim entitled to restitution for full amount billed for psychotherapy, even though a portion of the amount was paid by PacifiCare); *In re K.F.* (2009) 173 CA4th 655, 662–664, 92 CR3d 784 (victim entitled to restitution for amount billed when record was silent as to the amount that Kaiser would accept as full payment for services rendered).

Similarly, when the victim is covered by Medi-Cal, victim restitution for medical expenses is based on the amount actually paid by Medi-Cal and not the amount charged by the medical provider. *In re Anthony M.* (2007) 156 CA4th 1010, 1015–1019, 67 CR3d 734 (juvenile court erred in imposing restitution based on the amount charged by the medical provider). If the medical provider accepts payment from Medi-Cal for medical services rendered, that payment constitutes payment in full, and it is barred from seeking any unpaid balance from the patient. 42 CFR §447.15; Welf & I C §§14019.3(d), 14019.4(a). Under certain circumstances, Medi-Cal, on the other hand, may seek reimbursement from the patient or other responsible party for the amount it paid to the provider. 42 USC §§1396a(a)(25)(B), (a)(45), 1396k(a)(1)(A), (b). The court in *In re Anthony M.* distinguished *People v Hove* (1999) 76 CA4th 1266, 91 CR2d 128, in which the trial court ordered restitution in an amount in excess of that paid by Medi-Cal to cover continuing care costs beyond the date of
the award. No finding of ongoing medical care was made in *In re Anthony M.*, *supra*, 156 CA4th at 1019.

Following *In re Anthony M.*, the court in *In re Anthony S.* (2014) 227 CA4th 1352, 1357–1361, 174 CR3d 522, held that restitution in the amount of a hospital bill was proper, even though medical provider had written off the medical charges as uncollectible debt. The court stated that there was no evidence that the hospital had released the victim from the debt in such a way that collection would be barred by law.

(8) **§83.79** Payment by California State Bar’s Client Security Fund

A defendant is not entitled to an offset against a victim restitution order for the amount the victim has been compensated by the California State Bar’s Client Security Fund (CSF). *People v Hume* (2011) 196 CA4th 990, 126 CR3d 824. The defendant has no contractual right to compel reimbursement from the CSF. The decision to reimburse the victim is solely within the State Bar’s discretion. Moreover, the State Bar has statutory subrogation rights against the defendant. 196 CA4th at 998–1000. However, if the CSF makes a payment to the victim and receives an assignment from the victim, and the CSF thereafter exercises its assignment and subrogation rights and obtains a judgment against the defendant, the judgment will credit any amounts actually collected under the restitution order. 196 CA4th at 1000–1002.

(9) **§83.80** Payment by Workers’ Compensation Insurance Carrier

In cases where an employer is convicted of a crime against an employee, a payment to the employee or the employee’s dependent that is made by the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier must not be used to offset the amount of the restitution order unless the court finds that the defendant substantially met the obligation to pay premiums for that insurance coverage. Pen C §1202.4(f)(12).

(10) **§83.81** No Waiver of Full Restitution

The court must order full restitution to a victim. Cal Const art I, §28(b)(13); Pen C §1202.4(f). Under no circumstances may the court waive a portion or all of victim restitution.

(11) **§83.82** Audio-Video Hearing To Impose or Amend Restitution Order

Where such technology exists, the court may conduct a hearing to impose or amend a restitution order by two-way electronic audio-video
communication between a defendant incarcerated in state prison and the courtroom in place of defendant’s appearance in the courtroom. Pen C §1202.41(a)(1). The hearing is allowed only in those cases when the victim has received assistance from the Restitution Fund. Pen C §1202.41(a)(1). The hearing must be initiated through a request of the California Victim Compensation Board to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), to collaborate with the court to arrange the hearing. Pen C §1202.41(a)(1).

If the defendant is represented by counsel, the attorney may be present with the defendant during the hearing, or may be present in the courtroom if the CDCR establishes a confidential telephone and facsimile transmission link between the defendant and the attorney. Pen C §1202.41(a)(3).

The determination to hold a two-way audio-video hearing lies within the discretion of the court. The court has the authority to issue an order requiring the defendant to be physically present in those cases where circumstances warrant. Pen C §1202.41(a)(2).

If a defendant is incarcerated in a prison without two-way audio-video communication capability, and does not waive his or her right to be present at a hearing to amend a restitution order, the California Victim Compensation Board must determine whether the cost of holding the hearing is justified. If the Board determines that the cost of holding the hearing is not justified, the Board may not pursue the amendment of the restitution order. Pen C §1202.41(b).

(12) [§83.83] Restitution and Civil Actions

An order of restitution in favor of the crime victim does not preclude the victim (or the victim’s assignee) from pursuing a separate civil action based on the same facts from which the criminal conviction arose. However, in order to avoid a double recovery, the civil judgment must credit any amounts paid under the restitution order for the same losses. Pen C §1202.4(j); Vigilant Ins. Co. v Chiu (2009) 175 CA4th 438, 442–446, 96 CR3d 54 (embezzlement victim’s insurer pursued a civil action against defendant for reimbursement for the insured’s claim resulting from defendant’s theft, even though defendant already paid restitution).

Similarly, if a civil judgment precedes an order of restitution in the criminal court, the court must offset payment made on the civil judgment against the restitution order to the extent the payment covers economic losses for which restitution is being awarded. 175 CA4th at 446; People v Short (2008) 160 CA4th 899, 905, 73 CR3d 154; People v Bernal (2002) 101 CA4th 155, 165–166, 123 CR2d 622. This offset, however, does not

**f. Order**

(1) **[§83.84] Specificity and Form**

*Specificity.* The court’s restitution order must be specific and detailed, identifying each victim and each loss to the extent possible. Pen C §1202.4(f)(3). The court must clearly state the method used to calculate the restitution obligation and how that method justifies the amount of restitution ordered. While a trial court has broad discretion to choose a method for calculating the amount of restitution, it must employ a method that is rationally designed to determine the victim's economic loss. *People v Giordano* (2007) 42 C4th 644, 664, 68 CR3d 51; *People v Jones* (2010) 187 CA4th 418, 423–424, 114 CR3d 8 (trial court did not specify which losses were included in the restitution amount when ordering restitution for less than all losses claimed by victim). An order for restitution is unenforceable if it does not specify the amount of the losses to which it pertains. *People v Guardado* (1995) 40 CA4th 757, 762–763, 47 CR2d 81. Because a restitution order is enforceable by the victim as if it were a civil judgment (see §83.41), it must have the same degree of specificity as a civil judgment. 40 CA4th at 762. For discussion of procedure when the amount of restitution is uncertain at the time of sentencing, see §83.85.


*Separate form.* Many judges issue a separate copy of the restitution order for each victim because victims often need a certified copy of the order for enforcement purposes and are entitled to one on request. Pen C §1214(b); see discussion in §83.41. The California Victim Compensation Board is also entitled to a copy on request. Pen C §1214(b). Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3) also seems to contemplate separate orders.

*Notice to Board.* The court clerk must notify the California Victim Compensation Board within 90 days of the court’s imposition of a restitution order if the defendant is ordered to pay restitution to the Board because of the victim receiving compensation from the Restitution Fund. Pen C §1202.4(p).
(2) [§83.85] Amount Initially Uncertain

At the time of sentencing, the amount of restitution often cannot be fixed because necessary information is lacking or a subsequent hearing is needed to resolve a dispute about the amount. In these situations the court may order that it will determine the amount later. Pen C §1202.4(f); See People v Amin (2000) 85 CA4th 58, 62, 101 CR2d 756 (as part of plea bargain defendant agreed to pay restitution, and decision on amount reserved by court for later hearing). The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant for purposes of imposing or modifying restitution until the losses are determined. Pen C §1202.46. There is no limitation on when the court must set the restitution hearing. See People v Bufford (2007) 146 CA4th 966, 969–972, 53 CR3d 273 (trial court did not lose jurisdiction to order restitution, notwithstanding that defendant had fully served her prison sentence before the final restitution hearing was held). However, there are limitations when probation had been ordered. For discussion, see §83.90.

**JUDICIAL TIPS:**

- Judges often seek a waiver of defendant’s presence at the future restitution hearing. For judicial economy, judges will often set the date for the restitution hearing at the time of sentencing.
- When the defendant is sentenced to prison, it is highly advisable to address restitution prior to the defendant being transported to the prison. If the defendant is transported to prison with a “to be determined” order, it is highly unlikely that the victim will ever be able to obtain a restitution order unless the defendant waives his or her personal appearance at any future hearing. Counties typically cannot afford to bring a prisoner back to the local area for a restitution hearing. If the total amount of losses cannot be determined prior to the defendant being transported, the court should (1) order the amount that can be determined so that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) can start the collection, (2) include an order in the sentence for the defendant to pay any additional restitution in an amount to be determined by the court, and (3) seek a waiver of the defendant’s presence at any future restitution hearings. The court may also seek a stipulation that if restitution falls within a certain range, the defendant will agree to restitution and waive a hearing.
- There is a prevailing misperception that when a “to be determined order” is issued, the CDCR will subsequently set the amount of
restitution. CDCR can collect on restitution orders, but CDCR cannot set or order the amount.

(3) [§83.86] Comparative Negligence

The trial court may apply the doctrine of comparative negligence to reduce the award of victim restitution against a criminally negligent defendant when the court finds that the victim’s contributory negligence was a substantial factor in causing the victim’s injuries. People v Millard (2009) 175 CA4th 7, 36–43, 95 CR3d 751; but see People v Brunette (2011) 194 CA4th 268, 281–285, 124 CR3d 521 (court refused to extend Millard in animal cruelty case where animal welfare agency was seeking costs of caring for dogs it rescued).

Comparative negligence principles do not apply if the defendant’s conduct was intentional. People v Petronella (2013) 218 CA4th 945, 971, 166 CR3d 144 (State Compensation Insurance Fund’s contribution to the amount of its loss of premiums by failing to cancel defendant’s workers’ compensation policy when the Fund first discovered the possibility defendant was intentionally underreporting his payroll was not relevant to reduce the amount of victim restitution for defendant’s offenses of making false or fraudulent statements, since the case involved intentional fraud).

(4) [§83.87] Delegating Restitution Determination

General rule. The court may not delegate to the probation officer the duty to determine the amount of restitution. People v Cervantes (1984) 154 CA3d 353, 358, 201 CR 187; see Pen C §1202.4(f) (court must require restitution in amount to be established by court order). But see People v Lunsford (1998) 67 CA4th 901, 904, 79 CR2d 363 (restitution order directing county agency to determine amount at later time enforceable). As to minors, Welf & I C §730.6(h) allows the juvenile court to delegate to the probation officer the tasks of identifying losses and specifying the amount of restitution. In re Karen A. (2004) 115 CA4th 504, 507–511, 9 CR3d 369. Minors are entitled to a court hearing to dispute the probation officer’s determination of the restitution amount. Welf & I C §730.6(h)(2).

Delegation with consent. The court, with the defendant’s consent, may order the probation officer to set the amount of restitution. Pen C §1203.1k; see People v DiMora (1992) 10 CA4th 1545, 1549, 13 CR2d 616. The defendant can contest the probation officer’s determination in court. Pen C §1203.1k.

Delegation when amount uncertain at sentencing. When the extent of a victim’s loss cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing, People v Lunsford, supra, permits the court to order the defendant to pay restitution
in an amount to be determined by the local agency that administers the victim restitution program; the defendant has a right to a court hearing in accordance with Pen C §1202.4(f)(1).

**JUDICIAL TIPS:**

- Most judges seek defendant’s consent or proceed as discussed in §83.85.
- The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) is not authorized to initiate collection of restitution based on determinations by probation officers or other county agencies. CDCR must have a signed, sealed, and certified court order reflecting specific amounts and names of victims.

**Setting payment schedule.** Courts often delegate the task of setting up the defendant’s payment schedule to the probation department or another county agency. See *People v Ryan* (1988) 203 CA3d 189, 198, 249 CR 750. Payment schedules are not necessary for adults committed to the CDCR or youthful offenders committed to the CDCR’s Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Under statute, a specified percentage will be deducted from prison wages and trust account deposits. Pen C §2085.5(c); Welf & I C §§1752.81–1752.82.

**JUDICIAL TIP:** The defendant should be given an opportunity to challenge the determination.

**Relying on probation report.** The court may rely on the probation report in setting the amount of restitution. *People v Campbell* (1994) 21 CA4th 825, 830–832, 26 CR2d 433; *People v Foster* (1993) 14 CA4th 939, 946, 18 CR2d 1; see §83.54.

(5) [§83.88] Relation of Restitution Order to Probation

Penal Code §1202.4 applies whether or not the court grants probation. Pen C §1202.4(a)(1), (f).

**JUDICIAL TIP:** When defendant is sentenced to prison, an order for full restitution is as mandatory as in cases of probation.

When the court grants probation, payment of restitution must be made a condition of probation. Pen C §1202.4(m). Any portion of a restitution order that remains unsatisfied after a defendant is no longer on probation remains enforceable by the victim as if it were a civil judgment. Pen C §§1202.4(m), 1214(b).
JUDICIAL TIP: When probation is revoked or terminated, and the defendant is sentenced to CDCR, the initial order reflecting the restitution must be included in the legal documents accompanying the inmate to CDCR. In order for the restitution to continue to be collected, the victim must submit a request to CDCR.

The court may revoke a defendant’s probation based on the defendant’s willful failure to pay restitution when the defendant has the ability to do so. Pen C §1203.2(a); People v Lawson (1999) 69 CA4th 29, 35–36, 81 CR2d 283.

If the defendant is unable to pay full restitution within the initial term of probation, the court may modify and extend the period of probation to allow the defendant to pay off all restitution within the probation term. Pen C §1203.3(b)(4); People v Cookson (1991) 54 C3d 1091, 1097, 2 CR2d 176. Generally, the probation term may be extended up to but not beyond the maximum probation period allowed for the offense. People v Medeiros (1994) 25 CA4th 1260, 1267–1268, 31 CR2d 83. However, Pen C §1203.2(e) provides an exception, allowing probation to be extended past the maximum period if probation is revoked based on a violation of probation and the revocation has been set aside. In re Hamm (1982) 133 CA3d 60, 67, 183 CR 626.

A defendant is not entitled to have his or her conviction expunged under Pen C §1203.4 following termination of the defendant’s probation when the defendant has not paid the full amount of the restitution. For purposes of Pen C §1203.4, a defendant has not fulfilled a restitution condition of probation unless the defendant has made all court-ordered payments for the entire period of probation and has paid the obligation in full. People v Covington (2000) 82 CA4th 1263, 1271, 98 CR2d 852. However, if the defendant is discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation, the conviction must be expunged under Pen C §1203.4, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant may still owe an outstanding balance on victim restitution People v Seymour (2015) 239 CA4th 1418, 192 CR3d 113 (court noted the California Victim Compensation Board may pursue civil remedies if defendant does not honor the promise to pay the balance of restitution owed).

For a discussion of the court’s broad discretion under Pen C §1203.1 to order restitution as a condition of probation, see §83.106.

(6) [§83.89] Relation of Restitution Order to Restitution Fund

Victims of criminal acts may recover compensation from the state Restitution Fund under specified circumstances; the Fund is administered by the California Victim Compensation Board. Govt C §§13950–13969.7.
A restitution order does not preclude a victim’s right to financial assistance from the Fund, but the amount of such assistance is reduced by the amount the victim actually receives for the same loss under the restitution order. Pen C §1202.4(j).

Restitution payments are ordered to be deposited in the Fund to the extent that it provided compensation to the victim. Pen C §1202.4(f)(2). More broadly, when the Fund pays a victim, it is subrogated to the victim’s rights against persons liable for restitution. Pen C §1202.4(f)(2); Govt C §13963(a).

Assistance from the Fund as a result of the defendant’s conduct is presumed to be a direct result of the defendant’s crime and must be included in the amount of restitution ordered by the court. Pen C §1202.4(f)(4)(A). The amount of assistance provided by the Fund may be established by the submission of copies of bills reflecting services for medical or dental expenses, funeral or burial expenses, mental health counseling, wage or support losses, or rehabilitation. Pen C §1202.4(f)(4)(B). Certain categories of bills go through a bill review service (BRS), and the amount paid may be less than the amount billed. The Board will provide a statement of what was paid. Certified copies of bills provided by the Board and redacted to protect the victim’s privacy and safety or any legal privilege, together with a statement made under penalty of perjury by the custodian of records that the bills were submitted to and paid by the Board, are sufficient to meet this requirement. Pen C §1202.4(f)(4)(B); see People v Cain (2000) 82 CA4th 81, 87–88, 97 CR2d 836 (Board’s statement of claims paid on victim’s behalf is inherently reliable document).

If the defendant offers evidence to rebut the presumption that the assistance provided to victim was a direct result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, the court may release additional information contained in the Board’s records to the defendant only after (1) reviewing the information in camera, and (2) finding that the information is necessary for the defendant to dispute the amount of the restitution order. Pen C §1202.4(f)(4)(C); People v Lockwood (2013) 214 CA4th 91, 103, 153 CR3d 663 (to rebut presumption, the defendant must prove that his or her criminal conduct played, at most, “only an ‘infinitesimal’ or ‘theoretical’ part” in bringing about the injury).

(7) §83.90 Order Imposing Joint and Several Liability

A restitution order under Pen C §1202.4 may require codefendants to pay restitution jointly and severally. People v Blackburn (1999) 72 CA4th 1520, 1535, 86 CR2d 134; People v Madrana (1997) 55 CA4th 1044,
§83.91 Modification of Restitution Orders

A sentence without a full restitution award to a victim within Pen C §1202.4 is invalid; the trial court may properly add or modify a restitution order later. Pen C §1202.46; People v Rowland (1997) 51 CA4th 1745, 1750–1752, 60 CR2d 351; People v Brown (2007) 147 CA4th 1213, 1225–1226, 54 CR3d 887. See also People v Moreno (2003) 108 CA4th 1, 132 CR2d 918 (correction of sentence under Pen C §1202.46 not limited to situations where restitution amount is not ascertainable at the time of sentencing). The trial court retains jurisdiction to add or modify a restitution order even when an appeal is pending. People v Chagolla (1983) 144 CA3d 422, 434, 193 CR 711. And the trial court retains jurisdiction to impose or modify a restitution to award following a defendant’s completion of his or her term of incarceration. People v Bufford (2007) 146 CA4th 966, 969–972, 53 CR3d 273.

The trial court does not retain jurisdiction to impose or modify a restitution to award following a defendant’s completion of his or her term of probation. Hilton v Superior Court (2014) 239 CA4th 766, 168 CR3d 309. The Hilton court stated that Pen C §1203.3(b)(4) and (b)(5) reflected a legislative intent that trial courts will lack jurisdiction to impose restitution after the probationary term. 239 CA4th at 775–777. The court rejected the contention that the trial court retained jurisdiction to impose restitution under Pen C §1202.46, reasoning Pen C § 1202.46 must be harmonized with preexisting statutory and case law. 239 CA4th at 781–782. See also People v Waters (2015) 241 CA4th 822, 829–831, 194 CR3d 316 (trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction by imposing restitution 2 years after expiration of defendant’s otherwise successful completion of probation). However, if the defendant requests or otherwise agrees to a continuance of the restitution hearing to a time after the expiration of the defendant’s probationary term, the defendant implies his or her consent to
the trial court’s continued exercise of jurisdiction and is therefore estopped from challenging it. *People v Ford* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282, 286–289, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 919. Penal Code §1202.4(f)(1) authorizes courts to modify restitution on a motion of the prosecutor, victim, defendant, or court. Penal Code §1203.3(b)(5) additionally provides that nothing in Pen C §1203.3 prohibits the court from modifying the dollar amount of a restitution order under Pen C §1202.4(f) at any time during a defendant’s probation term. Both the prosecutor and the victim have a right to notice and a hearing before a restitution order may be modified. Pen C §§679.02(a)(3), 1191.1, 1202.4(f)(1); 1203.3(b)(1). See *Melissa J. v Superior Court* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 476, 478, 237 Cal.Rptr.5 (court set aside termination of restitution order made without notice to the victim or an opportunity for the victim to object). A victim at a modification hearing may testify by live, two-way audio and video transmission, if such capability is available at the court. Pen C §1202.4(f)(1).


g. Enforcement

(1) [§83.92] Satisfaction of Victim Restitution Before Other Court-Ordered Debt

Any funds collected by a court or law enforcement agencies from a person ordered to pay restitution must go to pay the restitution before being used to pay any other fines, penalties, assessments, or obligations that an offender may legally owe. Cal Const art I, §28(b)(13)(C).

☞ JUDICIAL TIP: A fine or assessment ordered at the time of sentencing but before a restitution order is imposed may be paid, even though it is collected before restitution.

See also Pen C §1203.1d (allocation of restitution payments) and Pen C §2085.5(j)–(k) (collection of monies from prisoners first distributed to victims).

(2) [§83.93] Income Deduction Orders

On entry of a restitution order under Pen C §1202.4, the court must enter a separate order for income deduction on determination of the defendant’s ability to pay, regardless of probation status, in accordance with Pen C §1203. Pen C §1202.42(a). The court may consider future earning capacity when determining the defendant’s ability to pay. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to pay. Pen C
§1202.42(a). Express findings as to the factors bearing on the deduction amount are not required. Pen C §1202.42(a).

The order is stayed as long as defendant pays restitution. Pen C §1202.42(b)(1). Penal Code §1202.42 includes detailed provisions for enforcing the order by service on defendant’s employer if defendant fails to meet the restitution obligation. Defendant has a right to notice and a hearing before the income deduction order is enforced. Pen C §1202.42(b)(2), (f). If a defendant fails to meet his or her restitution obligations without a showing of good cause for the failure, the court may, on the prosecutor’s request, order that the prosecutor be given authority to use lien procedures applicable to the defendant, including, but not limited to, a writ of attachment of property. Pen C §1202.42(g). By its terms, Pen C §1202.42 applies only to restitution orders made under Pen C §1202.4 or its predecessors.

❖ JUDICIAL TIP: The court should not consider making an income deduction order in the following situations:

- A restitution order directed to a juvenile offender under Welf & I C §730.6.
- An order to pay restitution for losses from conduct other than the commission of a crime of which defendant was convicted. See §§83.106–83.113.

County retirement benefits exemption. The court may not order a county retirement system to deduct restitution payments from a disability allowance owed to a defendant who is a retired county employee. Government Code §31452 provides an exemption from execution or other court process for benefits under county retirement systems. Board of Retirement v Superior Court (2002) 101 CA4th 1062, 1072, 124 CR2d 850.

For income deduction order and related forms, see Judicial Council Form CR-118 (Information Regarding Income Deduction Order), CR-119 (Order for Income Deduction), and CR-200 (Form Interrogatories—Crime Victim Restitution).

(3) [§83.94] Order To Apply Specified Portion of Income to Restitution

In two situations the court must order probationers to seek and maintain employment and apply a portion of earnings specified by the court to make restitution for the victim’s medical and psychological treatment expenses:

(1) Conviction of sexual assault on a minor. Pen C §1203.1g.
(2) Conviction of assault, battery, or assault with a deadly weapon on a senior. Pen C §1203.1j.

When probation is granted, the court may require as a condition of probation that the probationer go to work and earn money to pay any reparation condition and apply those earnings as directed by the court. Pen C §1203.1(d).

(4) [§83.95] Collection of Restitution by CDCR and DJJ

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the CDCR’s Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) collect restitution from the funds of inmates and wards in the same manner as restitution fines. Pen C §§2085.5(c); Welf & I C §§730.6(p), 1752.81; for discussion, see §83.25. The CDCR must transfer these funds to the California Victim Compensation Board for direct payment to the victim, or payment must be made to the Restitution Fund to the extent that the victim has received assistance under that program. The sentencing court must be provided a record of the payments made to the victims and of the payments deposited into the Restitution Fund. Pen C §2085.5(c). Victim restitution is collected before the restitution fine. Pen C §2085.5(j); Welf & I C §§730.6(p), 1752.81(f).

JUDICIAL TIPS:

• Courts should make sure that the CDCR and the DJJ are given restitution information that includes specific amounts and names, addresses, and phone numbers of victims.

• Courts should not direct the correctional institutions to collect restitution; their obligation to do so rests on statute, not court order.

Whenever a person is committed to the CDCR or a county jail under Pen C §1170(h) or is placed on postrelease community supervision or mandatory supervision, and the court has ordered the person to pay restitution to a victim, the following apply (Pen C §1203c(d)):

• If the victim consents, the probation officer of the county from which the person is committed may send the victim’s contact information and a copy of the restitution order to the CDCR or to the county agency designated by the board of supervisors to collect and distribute restitution for the sole purpose of distributing the restitution collected on behalf of the victim.
• The district attorney of the county from which the person is committed may send the victim’s contact information and a copy of the restitution order to the CDCR or to the county agency designated by the board of supervisors to collect and distribute restitution for the sole purpose of distributing the restitution collected on behalf of the victim if the district attorney finds it is in the best interest of the victim to send that information. If the victim affirmatively objects, the district attorney may not send the victim’s contact information. The district attorney is not required to inform the victim of the right to object.

• The victim’s contact information must remain confidential and must not be made part of the court file or combined with any public document.

The CDCR provides a form CDCR 1707 (Request for Victim Services) that a victim may complete and send to the CDCR to notify the CDCR of a restitution order. Completion of the form is not required for the CDCR to collect restitution on the victim’s behalf, but it greatly assists the CDCR in disbursing funds to victims, because it requests the victim’s address of where to send the money. Frequently, CDCR does not have this information, and therefore, disbursement of collections is thwarted. The victim may use form CDCR 1707 to request notification of the inmate’s status in prison or to request special conditions of parole or postrelease community supervision on the inmate’s release. The form can be obtained at the CDCR Office of Victim and Survivor Rights and Services website: www.cdcr.ca.gov/victim_services/application.html.

(5) [§83.96] Collection of Restitution From County Jail Prisoners

When a prisoner is punished by imprisonment in a county jail under Pen C §1170(h), the agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated is authorized to deduct a restitution order amount from the prisoner’s wages and trust account deposits. Pen C §2085.5(d). The agency must transfer any moneys collected to the California Victim Compensation Board for direct payment to the victim or to the Restitution Fund to the extent that the victim has received assistance under that program or may pay the victim directly. Pen C §2085.5(d). The sentencing court must be provided a record of the payments made to the victims and of the payments deposited into the Restitution Fund. Pen C §2085.5(d). Victim restitution is collected before the restitution fine. Pen C §2085.5(k).
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(6) §83.97 Collection of Restitution From Prisoners Released and Subject to Postrelease Community Supervision or Mandatory Supervision

When a prisoner is released from the custody of the CDCR or a county jail facility, and is subject to postrelease community supervision or mandatory supervision, he or she has a continuing obligation to pay any restitution order in full. Pen C §2085.6(b). The restitution order obligation and any portion left unsatisfied on placement in postrelease community supervision or mandatory supervision is enforceable and may be collected, in a manner to be established by the county board of supervisors, by the county agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is released. If a county elects to collect the restitution order, the department or county agency designated by the county board of supervisors must transfer the moneys to the California Victim Compensation Board or may pay the victim directly. Pen C §2085.6(b). The sentencing court must be provided a record of the payments made to the victims and of the payments deposited into the Restitution Fund. Pen C §2085.6(b). Victim restitution is collected before the restitution fine. Pen C §2085.6(e).

Any portion of the restitution order that remains unsatisfied after a person is released from postrelease community supervision or mandatory supervision continues to be enforceable by a victim under Pen C §1214 until the obligation is satisfied. Pen C §2085.6(c), (g).

(7) §83.98 Collection of Restitution From Prisoners Released on Suspended Sentence

When a prisoner who owes a restitution order, or any portion thereof, is released from the custody of a county jail facility after completion of a term in custody without being subject to postrelease community supervision or mandatory supervision under Pen C §1170(h)(5)(A), he or she has a continuing obligation to pay the restitution order in full. Pen C §2085.7(b). The balance of the restitution order remaining unpaid after completion of the term in custody is enforceable and may be collected, in a manner to be established by the county board of supervisors, by the department or county agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county in which the prisoner is released. If a county elects to collect restitution fines, the department or county agency designated by the county board of supervisors shall transfer the amount collected to the California Victim Compensation Board for deposit in the Restitution Fund or may
pay the victim directly. Pen C §2085.7(a). The sentencing court must be
provided a record of the payments made to the victims and of the
payments deposited into the Restitution Fund. Pen C §2085.7(a).

Any portion of the restitution order that remains unsatisfied after the
completion of a term in custody under Pen C §1170(h)(5)(A) continues to
be enforceable by a victim under Pen C §1214 until the obligation is
satisfied. Pen C §2085.7(c), (g).

(8) [§83.99] Collection of Restitution From Parolees

In any case in which a parolee owes a restitution order, the Secretary
of the CDCR may collect from the parolee any moneys owing on the
restitution order. Pen C §2085.5(h). Any monies collected must be
transferred to the California Victim Compensation Board for direct
deposit to the victim or to the Restitution Fund to the extent the victim
has received assistance under that program. Pen C §2085.5(h). The
sentencing court must be provided a record of the payments. Pen C
§2085.5(h). Victim restitution is collected before the restitution fine. Pen
C §2085.5(l).

(9) [§83.100] No Imprisonment To Satisfy Restitution
Order

Restitution orders cannot be converted to additional time spent in
custody under the provisions of Pen C §1205. Pen C §1205(f).

(10) [§83.101] Restitution Centers

The Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) may establish and operate restitution centers,
which are facilities that house nonviolent defendants who are required to
work outside the facilities during the day to pay off restitution owing to
their victims. Pen C §§6220–6236. Of the wages earned by a defendant
while housed at a restitution center, one-third is given to the victim, one-
third to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to pay for the
operation costs of the center, and one-third to the defendant’s savings
account. Pen C §6231. To participate in the restitution center, defendants
must be employable, provide no risk to the community, and have no prior
convictions of crimes involving violence, sex, or the sale of narcotics. See
Pen C §6228 for discussion of eligibility requirements.

At present, there are no restitution centers in operation in California.
(11) [§83.102] Financial Disclosure

A restitution order under Pen C §1202.4 subjects the defendant to detailed financial disclosure requirements in aid of enforcement. Pen C §1202.4(f)(5)–(11).

The defendant must disclose all assets, income, and liabilities in which he or she held or controlled a present or future interest as of the date of his or her arrest. Pen C §1202.4(f)(5); see Judicial Council Form CR–115 (Defendant’s Statement of Assets). The disclosure must be filed with the clerk of the court no later than the defendant’s sentencing date unless otherwise directed by the court under Pen C §1202.4(f)(8). Pen C §1202.4(f)(7).

The court may consider a defendant’s unreasonable failure to make a complete disclosure as (1) a circumstance in aggravation of the crime in imposing a term under Pen C §1170(b) or (2) a factor indicating that the interests of justice would not be served by admitting the defendant to probation, by conditionally sentencing the defendant, or by imposing less than the maximum fine and sentence fixed by law for the case. Pen C §1202.4(f)(9). A defendant’s failure or refusal to file a disclosure statement does not delay the entry of an order of restitution or pronouncement of sentence. Pen C §1202.4(f)(10). A defendant who willfully states as true on the disclosure any material matter that he or she knows to be false is guilty of a misdemeanor unless this conduct is punishable as perjury or another provision of law provides for a greater penalty. Pen C §1202.4(f)(5), (11).

Financial information filed by the defendant under Pen C §987(c) to determine if the defendant qualifies for court-appointed counsel may be used when the defendant fails to file the required financial disclosure. Pen C §1202.4(f)(6). In such an event, the defendant must be deemed to have waived confidentiality of the information. Pen C §1202.4(f)(6).

Filing of updated financial disclosure. If a defendant has a remaining unpaid balance on a restitution order or fine 120 days before the defendant’s scheduled release from probation or completion of a conditional sentence, the defendant must prepare and file a new and updated financial disclosure identifying all assets, income, and liabilities. Pen C §1202.4(f)(11). The defendant must file this updated financial disclosure with the court clerk no later than 90 days before the defendant’s scheduled release from probation or completion of the defendant’s conditional sentence. Pen C §1202.4(f)(11).

Use of interrogatories. A crime victim who has not received complete payment of restitution may serve Judicial Council Form CR–200...
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(12) [§83.103] Applying Seized Assets to Restitution

The court may apply funds confiscated from the defendant at the time of the defendant’s arrest, except for funds confiscated under Health & Safety Code §§11469–11495 (illegal drug funds), to the restitution order if the funds are not exempt for spousal or child support or subject to any other legal exemption. Pen Code §1202.4(f).

The common-law rule exempts from execution money belonging to an arrestee and held for safekeeping. See People v Willie (2005) 133 Cal.4th 43, 49–50, 34 Cal.3d 532. However, this common-law exemption does not apply to funds sought for payment of a restitution order. Although the money would have been taken from the defendant upon his or her preconviction arrest, the restitution order is a debt created after the defendant is convicted. 133 Cal.4th at 50. Further, this exemption has been superseded by CCP §704.090(b), which effectively limits the exemption to $300 for a restitution order. 133 Cal.4th at 50–52.

If a complaint alleges facts to support an aggravated white collar enhancement under Penal Code §186.11, or a large-scale financial crime, the prosecution may act to preserve the defendant’s assets for the payment of restitution. Pen Code §186.11 (d); see, e.g., People v Semaan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 79, 64 Cal.3d 1; Q-Soft, Inc. v Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.4th 441, 68 Cal.3d 687. The assets of the defendant that may be frozen are not limited to assets involved in the crime with which the defendant is charged, because the obligation to pay restitution is a general obligation. People v Semaan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 86–87.

Before the court may release seized assets to a victim, it must afford the defendant notice and opportunity to be heard in opposition to the victim’s claim. People v Chabear (1984) 163 Cal.3d 153, 155, 209 Cal.3d 218 (due process violation to deny defendant the right to challenge robbery victim’s claim of money seized during search of defendant’s residence). However, in People v Nystrom (1992) 7 Cal.4th 1177, 1181–1182, 10 Cal.2d 94, the court held, in contrast to Chabear, that a defendant was not entitled to notice and hearing before money seized at the time of arrest was released to the victim because the trial court had already entered a valid restitution order as part of a negotiated plea, and thus there was no question that the victim was entitled to the money. 7 Cal.4th at 1181–1182.
h. [§83.104] Juvenile Offenders

Juvenile restitution law under Welf & I C §730.6 parallels Pen C §1202.4. The more extensive case law on adult restitution can therefore be used by a juvenile court for guidance on most restitution issues. See In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 CA4th 1128, 1132–1133, 123 CR2d 316. Although there is a substantial similarity between juvenile and adult restitution law, there are the following exceptions:

- **Ability to pay.** For minors, as for adults, ability to pay is not a consideration in making restitution orders (Welf & I C §730.6(h)(1)), subject to an exception in Welf & I C §742.16 (when minor is unable to repair damage caused by vandalism or graffiti offense, order for monetary restitution depends on ability to pay).

- **Liability of parents.** Parents and guardians with joint or sole legal and physical custody and control of the minor are rebuttably presumed to be jointly and severally liable for a minor’s restitution obligation, subject to the court’s consideration of their inability to pay. Welf & I C §730.7(a). The parents or guardians have the burden of showing inability to pay and the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that they were either not given notice of potential liability for payment of restitution before the wardship petition was sustained or that they were not present during the proceedings when the petition was sustained and during any subsequent hearing addressing restitution. Welf & I C §730.7(a). The liability of parents and guardians is limited to $40,600 for each tort of the minor. Welf & I C §730.7(a); CC §1714.1; Cal Rules of Ct App B. A child’s age at the time of the offense, not his or her age on the date the restitution order is imposed, determines whether parents may be held jointly and severally liable. In re Jeffrey M. (2006) 141 CA4th 1017, 1022–1027, 46 CR3d 533 (defendant was age 17 when offense was committed but had reached majority at time of disposition order; trial court properly held parent liable for son’s restitution obligation).

- **Economic losses.** Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3) includes interest, attorney’s fees, and collection costs in the definition of economic losses; Welf & I C §730.6 does not. However, the Second District Court of Appeal has held that a juvenile offender can be ordered to pay restitution for the victim’s legal fees and costs that the victim incurred to collect restitution. In re Imran Q. (2008) 158 CA4th
1316, 1319–1321, 71 CR3d 121 (Welf & I C §730.6’s silence on attorney’s fees and costs is a mere legislative oversight). See also In re M.W. (2008) 169 CA4th 1, 4–7, 86 CR3d 545 (cost of mental health services incurred by victim of crime committed by a juvenile is a recoverable loss even though not specifically enumerated in Welf & I C §730.6(h)(1)).

- Financial disclosure. Welfare and Institutions Code §730.6 does not impose financial disclosure requirements on juvenile offenders.
- Wage deduction order. Juvenile offenders are not subject to such orders. See Pen C §1202.42.
- Identification of victims. The restitution order, to the extent possible, must identify each victim, unless the court for good cause finds that the order should not identify the victim(s). Welf & I C §730.6(h)(1).
- Retention of jurisdiction to determine restitution amount. If the amount of restitution cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing, the court retains jurisdiction to determine restitution only during the minor’s term of commitment or probation. Welf & I C §730.6(h)(1). The minor’s restitution obligation may extend beyond expiration of wardship and into adulthood. In re Keith C. (2015) 236 CA4th 151, 155–157, 186 CR3d 339 (trial court had authority to enter an abstract of judgment restating the restitution order on termination of the defendant’s wardship, more than 2 years after he turned 21 years of age); In re J.V. (2014) 231 CA4th 1331, 1335–1336, 180 CR3d 711 (requiring that defendant be no older than 21 years at the time of issuance of an order/abstract that memorializes a previously entered, valid restitution order would negate the Legislature’s express intent to permit victims to enforce juvenile restitution orders in the same manner as civil judgments).
- Restitution as condition of deferred entry of judgment. When a child participates in a deferred entry of judgment program (Welf & I C §§790–795), the juvenile court may require the child to pay victim restitution as a condition of probation. Welf & I C §794; G.C. v Superior Court (2010) 183 CA4th 371, 376–378, 107 CR3d 514.

i. [§83.105] Remand for Resentencing

A restitution order may be increased or imposed for the first time after a remand for resentencing following the defendant’s partially successful appeal. People v Harvest (2000) 84 CA4th 641, 646–650, 101
§83.106 Restitution fines may not be increased after remand for resentencing following a successful appeal. See §83.20.

3. [§83.106] Restitution as Condition of Probation

The court has broad discretion to order restitution as a condition of probation consistent with the ends of fostering rehabilitation and protecting public safety. Pen C §1203.1(a)(3), (j); People v Anderson (2010) 50 C4th 19, 26–27, 112 CR3d 685. Under Pen C §1203.1(j), the court can order restitution as a condition of probation even when the losses are not necessarily caused by the criminal conduct underlying the defendant’s conviction. 50 C4th at 26–27. However, the restitution condition must be reasonably related either to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to the goal of deterring future criminality. People v Carbajal (1995) 10 C4th 1114, 1121–1124, 43 CR2d 681. In People v Rugamas (2001) 93 CA4th 518, 521, 113 CR2d 271, the court upheld, as a condition of probation, restitution for the cost of medical treatment received by the defendant and paid for by the police department. The treatment was administered as a result of injuries sustained by the defendant when the police shot him with rubber bullets. Even though the police department was not a victim entitled to restitution under the mandatory restitution provisions of Pen C §1202.4, the restitution order was proper under Pen C §1203.1. The restitution was reasonably related to both the crime of which the defendant was convicted (brandishing weapon to avoid arrest) and the goal of deterring future criminality. See also In re I.M. (2005) 125 CA4th 1195, 1208–1211, 23 CR3d 375 (restitution for funeral expenses of murder victim’s family was properly imposed, as a condition of probation, against a juvenile offender who was found to have acted as an accessory after the fact in connection with the murder; order was reasonably related to the crime of which defendant was convicted and was calculated to deter defendant’s gang involvement). Compare People v Woods (2008) 161 CA4th 1045, 1049–1053, 74 CR3d 786 (defendant who is convicted of acting as accessory after the fact of murder and sentenced to prison could not be required to pay restitution for economic losses resulting from the murder).

When ordering restitution under Pen C §1203.1, the court is not restricted to directing payment to only those victims as defined in Pen C §1202.4(k). People v Anderson (2010) 50 C4th 19, 32–34, 112 CR3d 685. In Anderson, the defendant was convicted of fleeing the scene of an accident resulting in death and was placed on probation under Pen C
§1203.1. The trial court, as a condition of probation, ordered the defendant to pay restitution directly to the hospital that provided treatment to the deceased victim. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and stated that defendant’s contention that the hospital was not a direct victim entitled to restitution was without merit because the “victim” definitions of Pen C §1202.4 are not incorporated into Pen C §1203.1. 50 C4th at 34. The court stated that under the particular circumstances of the case, an order of restitution payable directly to the hospital was not unreasonable. The court noted that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the hospital made an independent claim for restitution, and therefore, “this was not a circumstance in which a restitution was being diverted from the victim to satisfy a third party claim.” 50 C4th at 33. Also, the victim’s family would not be burdened by having to open probate of the victim’s estate to accommodate payment of the restitution award. And the order “assured that amends be made to society for the criminal violation because the hospital would be paid for the care it was required by law to provide” and rendered the defendant “accountable for the financial harm he caused and contributed to his reformation and rehabilitation.” 50 C4th at 33–34.

A similar provision to Pen C §1203.1j is found in Welf & I C §730(b). Under Welf & I C §730(b), when a ward is placed under the supervision of the probation officer or committed to the care, custody, and control of the probation officer, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward, including the imposition of any reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the ends that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. See In re G.V. (2008) 167 CA4th 1244, 1248–1251, 84 CR3d 809.

a. [§83.107] Hit-and-Run and DUI Cases

Conviction of a hit-and-run or misdemeanor DUI offense does not establish responsibility for the accident in which defendant was involved. See People v Braz (1998) 65 CA4th 425, 432, 76 CR2d 531 (in a hit-and-run case the crime is the running, not the hitting). However, even though the criminal act of running did not cause the loss, the court may order restitution as a condition of probation, at least when “there is no question as to defendant’s responsibility for the loss.” People v Carbajal (1995) 10 C4th 1114, 1124, 43 CR2d 681 (defendant conceded liability in hit-and-run accident); People v Kleinman (2004) 123 CA4th 1476, 1479–1481, 20 CR3d 885 (hit-and-run); People v Phillips (1985) 168 CA3d 642, 650, 214 CR 417 (DUI).
Restitution is appropriate in these cases because it is reasonably related to the crime of which defendant was convicted and to the goal of probation to deter future criminality. *People v Carbajal, supra,* 10 C4th at 1123. It is particularly important for the court to

- Notify defendant that the court may consider requiring restitution as a condition of probation and
- Give defendant “a meaningful opportunity to controvert the information” that the court considers. 10 C4th at 1125.

The Fourth District of the Court of Appeal has applied the reasoning of *Carbajal* in a nonprobation case. See *People v Rubics* (2006) 136 CA4th 452, 456–461, 38 CR3d 886 (defendant was convicted of felony hit-and-run that resulted in victims’ death, sentenced to prison, and ordered to pay funeral expenses as direct restitution to victim’s family).

**JUDICIAL TIPS:**

- In the absence of a plea agreement, restitution in a hit-and-run case (Veh C §§20001, 20002) or misdemeanor DUI case (Veh C §23152) should probably be ordered only when it is obvious or undisputed that defendant caused the accident.
- Convictions of felony DUI causing injury (Veh C §23153) pose no causation problems and should be handled as mandatory restitution cases. See *People v Walker* (2014) 231 CA4th 1270, 1274–1276, 180 CR3d 700 (court may impose restitution for all victims of a single incident of DUI causing injury for which the defendant is convicted and sentenced to prison, whether or not those victims are named in the charging document); *People v Pino* (1998) 60 CA4th 1403, 1405–1407, 71 CR2d 151 (defendant placed on probation for violation of Veh C §23153 ordered to pay direct restitution to victim under Pen C §1202.4).

b. [§83.108] Concealing, Selling, or Withholding Stolen Property

A conviction for violating Pen C §496 conviction does not make a defendant responsible for the losses related to the underlying theft; the restitution order should be for losses proximately caused by concealing, selling, or withholding the stolen property. *People v Holmberg* (2011) 195 CA4th 1310, 1320–1324, 125 CR3d 878.
4. [§83.109] Restitution Ordered as Part of Split Sentence

Victim restitution ordered as part of a sentence to county jail followed by mandatory supervision pursuant to Pen C §1170(h) is an order under Pen C §1202.4, and therefore its scope is limited to those losses arising out of the criminal activity that formed the basis of the conviction. People v Rahbari (2014) 232 CA4th 185, 190–196, 181 CR3d 220 (mandatory supervision is akin to a state prison commitment; it is not a grant of probation or a conditional sentence).

5. Restitution Based on Dismissed Counts and Uncharged Crimes: Harvey Waivers

a. [§83.110] General Principles

Dismissed counts. The court may order restitution on dismissed counts when the negotiated disposition includes a Harvey waiver. Pen C §1192.3. See, e.g., People v Campbell (1994) 21 CA4th 825, 26 CR2d 433; People v Beck (1993) 17 CA4th 209, 21 CR2d 250. Harvey waivers derive their name from People v Harvey (1979) 25 C3d 754, 758, 159 CR 696 (defendant to suffer no adverse sentencing consequences from dismissed count in absence of contrary agreement). See People v Moser (1996) 50 CA4th 130, 132, 57 CR2d 647. After entering into a Harvey waiver, the defendant may not present evidence disputing liability for the dismissed charge(s) in order to avoid payment of restitution. People v Weatherton (2015) 238 CA4th 676, 682–686, 189 CR3d 611. With a Harvey waiver, the plea agreement need not specifically refer to restitution on dismissed counts. People v Campbell, supra, 21 CA4th at 829–830. In judicial wardship proceeding, a juvenile defendant may be ordered, as a condition of probation under Welf & I C §730, to pay restitution on dismissed counts without a Harvey waiver. In re T.C. (2009) 173 CA4th 837, 843–850, 93 CR3d 447.

Uncharged Crimes. A Harvey waiver may be advisable when seeking restitution for uncharged crimes, but it is not required. People v Snow (2012) 205 CA4th 932, 936–940, 141 CR3d 41 (no waiver required when court imposed restitution for uncharged offense as a condition of probation).

b. [§83.111] Burden of Proof

The prosecution has the burden of proving defendant’s culpability for uncharged or dismissed offenses by a preponderance of the evidence when the defendant denies having committed them. People v Baumann (1985) 176 CA3d 67, 80, 222 CR 32.
JUDICIAL TIP: Disputes concerning this culpability can be avoided by having the plea agreement pinpoint the matters on which the court may order restitution. See, e.g., People v Moser (1996) 50 CA4th 130, 133, 57 CR2d 647.

For the amount of restitution, the rule is the same as for orders under Pen C §1202.4: defendant has the task of showing that the recommendation of the probation officer or the figures of the victims are inaccurate. People v Baumann, supra; 176 CA3d at 79–80; see §83.55.

c. [§83.112] Relation to Probation

The court may make a valid restitution order under a Harvey waiver even when it does not place defendant on probation. See People v Beck (1993) 17 CA4th 209, 21 CR2d 250 (defendant sentenced to prison); but see People v Carabajal (1995) 10 C4th 1114, 1120–1123, 43 CR2d 681 (dicta that authority to order restitution in situations not covered by Pen C §1202.4 derives from court’s discretion to impose probation conditions); People v Lai (2006) 138 CA4th 1227, 1246–1249, 42 CR3d 444. See also People v Percelle (2005) 126 CA4th 164, 178–180, 23 CR3d 731, discussed in §83.45.

6. [§83.113] Restitution Based on Conduct Resulting in Acquittal

The court may impose a restitution order as a condition of probation, for a crime of which the defendant was acquitted. People v Lent (1975) 15 C3d 481, 483, 124 CR 905.

IV. [§83.114] INFORMATION ABOUT THE CALIFORNIA VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARD

Authority

The California Victim Compensation Board (CalVCB) is a state program dedicated to providing reimbursement for many crime-related expenses to eligible victims who suffer physical injury or threat of physical injury as a direct result of a violent crime. (Govt C §§13950–13966).

Losses That May Be Covered

- Medical/dental
- Mental health counseling
• Wage/income
• Support loss
• Funeral/burial
• Job retraining
• Relocation
• Residential security
• Retrofitting of residence and/or vehicle
• Crime scene cleanup
• Medical equipment
• Veterinary services, replacement costs, or other reasonable expenses, as ordered by the court pursuant to Pen C §600.2 or §600.5, in an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000)

Losses That Are Not Covered
• Expenses not related to the crime
• Expenses paid by another source of reimbursement or recovery
• Expenses for lost, stolen, or damaged property (including cash)
• Pain and suffering

Losses not covered by CalVCB may be recoverable through court-ordered restitution as a part of a convicted perpetrator’s criminal sentence or through the enforcement of a judgment obtained in a civil lawsuit against the perpetrator or liable party.

Who Is Eligible?
• A victim who was injured or died as a result of a crime.
• A derivative victim who was not directly injured or killed as a result of a crime but who, at the time of the crime,
  — was the parent, grandparent, sibling, spouse, domestic partner, child or grandchild of the victim;
  — was living in the household of the victim;
  — had lived with the victim for at least 2 years in a relationship similar to a parent, grandparent, sibling, spouse, child, or grandchild of the victim;
  — was another family member of the victim, including, but not limited to, the victim’s fiancé or fiancée and witnessed the crime; or
§83.114 — was not the primary caretaker of a minor victim, but is now the primary caretaker.

In addition, when a victim dies as a result of a crime, CalVCB may reimburse any individual who voluntarily, and without anticipation of personal gain, pays or assumes the obligation to pay medical and/or funeral/burial expenses. Also, when a crime occurs in a residence, CalVCB may reimburse any individual who voluntarily, and without anticipation of personal gain, pays or assumes the obligation to pay the reasonable crime scene cleanup expenses.

Who Is Not Eligible?

- Persons who commit the crime.
- Persons who contribute to or are involved in the events leading to the crime.
- Persons who failed to reasonably cooperate with law enforcement in the apprehension and conviction of the criminal committing the crime.
- Persons who do not cooperate with staff of the Board and/or the Victim/Witness Assistance Center in the verification of the claim.

Additionally, no person who is convicted of a violent felony listed in Pen C §667.5(c) may be compensated for any losses incurred during parole, probation, postrelease community supervision (PRCS), mandatory supervision, or incarceration.

These Requirements Must Be Met

Except as provided in Govt C §13956, a person is eligible for compensation when all the following requirements are met:

- The person for whom compensation is being sought is a victim, derivative victim, or a person who is entitled to reimbursement for funeral, burial, or crime scene cleanup expenses.
- Either
  - the crime occurred in California, whether or not the victim was a resident of California during the time period that the Board determines that federal funds are available, or
  - whether or not the crime occurred in California, the victim was a resident of California, a member of the military
stationed in California, or a family member living with a member of the military stationed in California.

- If compensation is being sought for a derivative victim regardless of whether they are a resident of California or not, they must meet the definition of derivative victim.
- The victim or derivative victim must reasonably cooperate with law enforcement in the apprehension and conviction of the criminal committing the crime.
- The victim or the applicant, if other than the victim, must cooperate with the staff of the Board and/or the Victim/Witness Assistance Center in the verification of the claim.
- All other sources of reimbursement must be used first.

Felony Convictions

No person who is convicted of a violent felony listed in Pen C §667.5(c) may be compensated for any losses incurred during parole, probation, postrelease community supervision (PRCS), mandatory supervision, incarceration, or while required to register as a sex offender. Once that person has been discharged from the above-listed restrictions, crime-related expenses incurred after that time are eligible for CalVCB assistance. Any crime-related losses that were not incurred during parole, probation, PRCS, mandatory supervision, incarceration, or while the person was required to register as a sex offender may be considered for compensation. CalVCB may compensate a person seeking reimbursement for funeral/burial expenses of a victim who died as a result of the crime without respect to any felony status of the victim.

Filing Deadlines

An application for compensation must be filed within 3 years of the date of the crime, 3 years after the victim attains 18 years of age, or 3 years of the time the victim or derivative victim knew (or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered) that an injury or death had been sustained as a direct result of crime, whichever is later.

An application based on any crime eligible for prosecution under Pen C §801.1 (specified sex crimes involving a minor) may be filed any time before the victim’s 28th birthday.

The Board may for good cause grant an extension of these time periods. The factors to be considered in finding good cause are set forth in Govt C §13953(b).
Filing Assistance

Victim/Witness Assistance Centers are located throughout the state. These centers have staff who are trained to help victims apply for compensation from CalVCB.

Applicants may also be helped by a private attorney. Government Code §13957.7(g) states the Board shall pay attorney’s fees in an amount equal to 10 percent of the approved award, or five hundred dollars ($500), whichever is less. The attorney’s fees are not deducted from the applicant’s award and are paid separately from the approved award. The law also prohibits attorneys from charging, demanding, receiving, or collecting any amount for their services except as may be awarded by the Board.

Emergency Awards

If the victim has an urgent unreimbursed loss of wages or income, emergency medical treatment expenses, funeral/burial expenses, crime scene cleanup expenses, and/or relocation expenses as a direct result of a crime, he or she may be eligible for an emergency award. The amount of an emergency award depends on the immediate needs of the victim or derivative victim, subject to the rates and limitations established by the Board.

Applications for emergency awards are processed within 30 calendar days of application.

If upon final disposition of the regular application, it is found that the applicant is not eligible for compensation from the Board, the applicant must reimburse the Board for the emergency award.

Verification and Hearing on the Application

Applications filed with CalVCB are reviewed to determine eligibility. After completion of this review, the victim will be advised by mail of staff’s recommendation to the Board. An applicant has the right to appeal an adverse decision.

An applicant for an emergency award is not entitled to a hearing to contest the denial of an emergency award. However, denial of an emergency award does not prevent further consideration of an application for a regular award and does not affect the applicant’s right to a hearing if staff recommends denial of the regular award.
CalVCB Pays Last

CalVCB is the “payer of last resort.” If the victim has any other sources of reimbursement or recovery available for crime-related losses, he or she must use these available sources before receiving compensation from CalVCB. If the victim receives other reimbursements or recoveries after obtaining benefits from CalVCB, he or she must repay CalVCB. Reimbursement or recovery sources the victim may have available include, but are not limited to, medical, dental, public program benefits, auto insurance, workers’ compensation benefits, civil lawsuit recovery, or court-ordered restitution.

By using all other sources of reimbursement or recovery, CalVCB is able to assist victims who have no other source of reimbursement or recovery for their losses.

If the victim fails to disclose available sources of reimbursement or recovery, the claim may be denied by the Board for lack of cooperation. If this happens, the victim may have to repay CalVCB for any amount already paid to him or her or on his or her behalf.

General Payment Limitations

The total of all reimbursements to a victim cannot exceed the maximum CalVCB benefit of $70,000.

There are also several specific payment limitations governing particular benefits under CalVCB including, but not limited to, loss of wages/income, loss of support, medical expenses, mental health counseling expenses, residential security expenses, relocation expenses, residential and/or vehicle retrofitting expenses, and funeral/burial expenses.

A provider who accepts payment from the Board for a service shall accept the Board’s rates as payment in full and may not accept any payment from any other source. A provider may not charge a victim or derivative victim for any difference between the cost of a service provided and the Board’s payment for that service.

An applicant’s eligibility for CalVCB benefits does not guarantee payment for services rendered.
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